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THE LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT*
Robert Force** and Lawrence Griffith***
I. BACKGROUND. AND INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter LAPA),
which is located in Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, became
effective in July, 1967. Its early history has been described elsewhere.'
* This article is based on "A Report to the Legislature of the State of Louisiana
on the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act."
* Thomas Pickles Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law.
* B.A., College of William and Mary, second-year student, Tulane University
School of Law. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of William Muller,
Tulane University School of Law, Class of 1982.
1. The LAPA was enacted as La. Acts No. 382, S 1 in 1966 and is now LA. R.S.
49:951-970. The Act was based in part on the Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act, changes in that Act which had been introduced in various states, the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. SS 501-703 (1976), and innovations which
resulted from the legislative process. The Act originally was proposed by a Joint Com-
mittee on the Formulation of Rules of Administrative Procedure.
The Chairman of the Interim Joint Legislative Committee on Formulation of Ad-
ministrative Rules of Procedure was quoted as saying "that the purpose of the APA
was 'to establish a basic, streamlined system to replace the hundreds of rules and
regulations in some 189 state agencies, commissions and boards ... ' " Note, Loui-
siana's "New" Administrative Procedure Act, 35 LA. L. REV. 629, 630 n.6 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as "New" APAI.
"The Louisiana APA was enacted in response to concern that the procedure used
by many agencies having an 'important impact on the economic and social welfare
of the citizenry' fell short of compliance with due process .. " Id. at 630.
The Act, however did not replace all agency procedures; only those procedures
falling below the minimum due process standards established in the statute were
intended to be supplemented. "The prime purpose [of the APAJ was to provide
procedural requirements for agencies which were set up with very little if any
such requirements in the substantive statutes."
Id. at 630 n.6.
.The need for the Act grew out of a situation in which there were "over fifty
Louisiana agencies that hold administrative proceedings or hearings and . . . many
of these agencies do not have any written rules of procedure." Dakin, The Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Critique and Commentary, 25 LA. L. REV.
799 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dakin, Revised APA]. This article by Professor Dakin,
though written prior to the enactment of the LAPA, is very instructive in under-
standing the Louisiana Act. In his article Professor Dakin analyzes the Revised Model
State Act and discusses its strengths and weaknesses, especially in domparison with
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the acts adopted in various states. The
Louisiana Act is a blend of various models coupled with some innovation. As Pro-
fessor Dakin critiques the Model APA one comes to understand why certain approaches
were favored over others in drafting and enacting the LAPA. Of course, he did not
prevail on every point. Still, the article is most helpful in understanding the LAPA.
The following works were also consulted and found useful: Bonfield, The Iowa Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Application, Public Access to
Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IOWA L. REV. 731 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
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Since enactment, the LAPA has been amended nine times, affecting
some six of its sixteen substantive sections, and five new sections
have been added. Several sections have been amended more than once.
These amendments have had varying impact on the Act.
At the time of enactment the LAPA was sound legislation. It
covered the major areas of need, was well drafted and was comparable
to the legislation in other states which had used similar models.2 In
many respects, since the Act was a blend of two "models," and since
it included some original approaches, it was a better piece of legisla-
tion than either of the models. The intervening modifications and ad-
ditions through the amendment process helped to improve the Act.
However, some problems which stem from the original Act have never
been resolved. Some areas are less than clear. Furthermore, during
the last two or three years the models on which the LAPA itself was
based have been subjected to very careful scrutiny.'
Five major functions are included in the LAPA. These are:
1. Public access to information;
2. Rule-making procedures;
3. Adjudication procedures;
4. Judicial review; and
5. Legislative oversight.'
Each of these functions will be discussed in this article. However,
first an examination of the scope and applicability of the Act is
essential.
Bonfield, Iowa APA]; Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under
the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 IowA L. REv. 285 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Bonfield, Adjudication]; I & II F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1st ed. 1965);
K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978); Comments in THE NATIONAL CON.
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT (1981).
2. See Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note 1. See also N.Y. S.A.P.A. LAW S 100
(McKinney); Tennessee Administrative Procedure Act, TENN. CODE ANN. S 4-5-102.
3. The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act again has been re-
vised extensively by a committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and in August, 1981, the Commissioners adopted this revised
version as the Model Administrative Procedure Act of 1981. Changes have been made
in the Federal law and numerous other changes have been proposed. See Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. S 601412; Regulation Reform Act of 1979, S.755, CONG.
REC. S.3338, Mar. 26, 1979; S.1291, CONG. REc. S.7128, June 6, 1979.
4. A new provision on gubernatorial oversight has been added. See text at notes
295-98, infra.
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II. APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT
The LAPA does not apply to every administrative body in the
State of Louisiana. The original Act defined "Agency" as including
"each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by
law to make rules or to formulate and issue decisions except" the
legislature or any branch, committee or officer thereof, the courts,
and certain specified departments of the state government.8
In 1974 the definition of "Agency" was amended, apparently to
include many of the agencies originally excluded from the definition
in the original Act." "Agency" was changed to include any board, com-
mission, department, or officer authorized by law to make rules or
to formulate and issue decisions and orders "except the legislature
or any. branch, committee, or officer thereof, . . .and the courts."
One commentator stated that "[tihe amendment clearly was intended
to bring within the scope of the Louisiana APA those agencies ex-
empted by the original Act. '7 The same commentator suggested that
the amendment also intended to repeal the special exemptions given
to the State Bond Commission and the Atchafalaya Basin Division
However, the Attorney General issued an opinion which reached the
opposite conclusion.' The 1974 amendment, by adding a new section,
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:967, provided several explicit exemp-
tions from certain aspects of the LAPA. The Department of Revenue,
the Department of Employment Security, the Department of Highways
and the Board of Tax Appeals, although they are not exempted from
the procedures which apply to rule-making, are exempted from the
other provisions of the Act.
The term "Agency" was again amended in 1975 and 1978." In 1976,
5. The Department of Public Welfare, Department of Conservation, Department
of Revenue, Division of Employment Security, Department of Labor, the Department
of Hospitals, the State Mineral Board, and the Department of Highways are excluded.
LA. R.S. 49.-951(2) (Supp. 1966). To this list should be added the State Bond Commission
and the Atchafalaya Basin Division. "New" APA, supra note 1, at 635-36.
6. 1974 La. Acts, No. 284, S 1.
7. "New" APA, supra note 1, at 634.
8. Id. at 634-35.
9. Id. at 635 (citing 1974 LA. Op. ATT-Y GEN. No. 74-1246 (Sept. 17, 1974)).
10. 1975 La. Acts, No. 730, S 1; 1978 La. Acts, No. 252, S 1. "Agency" under the
1975 amendment meant
each state board, commission, or department which makes rules, regulations, or
policy, or formulates, or issues decisions or orders pursuant to, or as directed
by, or in implementation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the
constitution or statutes of Louisiana, except the legislature or any branch, com-
mittee, or officer thereof, and the courts.
Again "Agency" was redefined in 1978 to mean
19821 1229
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the Department of Highways was removed from the exempt category."
The 1976 amendment repealed the provisions which had been inter-
preted formerly as creating special exemptions for the State Bond
Commission and the Atchafalaya Basin Division. In addition, the
amendment applied the newly added legislative oversight provision,
Revised Statutes section 49:968, to those agencies otherwise exemp-
ted by section 967.12
The most recent definition of "Agency" is contained in a 1979
amendment to the Act.'" Currently, "Agency" is defined as:
each state board, commission, department, agency, officer or other
entity which makes rules, regulations, or policy, or formulates,
or issues decisions or orders pursuant to, or as directed by, or
in implementation of the constitution or laws of the United States
or the constitution and statutes of Louisiana except the legislature
or any branch, committee, or officer thereof, any political subdivi-
sion as defined in Article VI, Section 44 of the Louisiana Con-
stitution, and any board, commission, department, agency, officer,
or other entity thereof, and the courts.'4
This amendment has tried to clarify that so far as rule-making
is concerned every agency (unless specifically exempted by section
49:967) must follow the LAPA provisions. Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:966 provides, inter alia, that "any and all statutory requirements
regarding the adoption or promulgation of rules other than those con-
tained in . . . [the LAPAJ . . . are hereby superseded by the provi-
sions of this Chapter and are repealed."' 5
The general applicability of the LAPA to agency actions clearly
is revealed by a provision in the original Act which is contained to..
day in section 49:966B and which states in part: "No subsequent legisla..
tion shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Chapter
except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly."
each state board, commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity which
makes rules, regulations, or policy, or formulates, or issue decisions or orders
pursuant to, or as directed by, or in implementation of the constitution or laws
of the United States or the constitution and statutes of Louisiana, except the
legislature or any branch, committee, or officer thereof and the courts.
11. 1976 La. Acts, No. 279, S 1.
12. The exemptions section, 49:967, was amended to make some technical changes
in the names of agencies, to wit, the Department of Revenue and Taxation(s) and the
Office of Employment Security. It also exempted the State Civil Service Commission
and the Public Service Commission from some of the legislative oversight provisions,
namely those contained in section 968F(4).
13. 1979 La. Acts, No. 578, S 1.
14. LA. R.S. 49:951(2) (Supp. 1981).
15. Id. S 966(A).
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The jurisdictional provisions of the Act would seem clear. All Loui-
siana governmental entities which promulgate rules or make decisions
under the Louisiana Constitution and statutes are subject to the Act,
unless they are part of the legislature, the judiciary, or political sub-
divisions or entities thereof, or unless expressly exempted from the
Act. Despite this apparent clarity, disputes as to the applicability of
the Act have arisen. One of the most important questions has dealt
with the status of the Public Service Commission. In the middle 1970's
both the Attorney General" and one commentator" concluded that
the Commission was subject to the Act except to the extent that it
was obligated by the constitution to follow expressly enumerated pro-
cedures. The Commission had not been included by the legislature
in its enumeration of exempt agencies, and was certainly a state
governmental entity which formulated rules and made decisions. The
Attorney General opined that the legislature intended to include the
Commission in its expanded definition of "Agency" in 1974 because
the lawmakers were aware of the new constitution and the provisions
of article VI, section 21 which relate to the Commission.
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed with this result in Loui-
siana Consumer's League, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission.8 The Consumer's League had challenged the manner in
which the Commission purported to change one of its rules. The pro-
cedure used by the Commission, which curtailed public input, did not
comply with the procedure for rule changes mandated by the LAPA.
The court said that since the Louisiana Constitution authorized the
Commission to "adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations and
procedures . . .," this grant of power "precludes the legislature from
enacting statutes which would restrict the Commission's ability to
adopt its own rules, regulations and procedures. Accordingly, the rule-
making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are not
applicable."" Is there an implication that non-rule-making provisions
of the Act may be applicable? This is not necessarily so. If the Com
mission's power to formulate rules cannot be affected by the
legislature, there is no reason why it should not be allowed to for-
mulate its own rules on any matter within its jurisdiction including
such non-rule-making matters as adjudication.
The Commission would appear also to be outside of the scope of
the legislative oversight provisions of the Act, since the Commission
draws its legislative power from the constitution instead of the
16. 1975 LA. Op. ATTY GEN. No. 74-89 (Mar. 21, 1975).
17. "New" APA, supra note 1, at 636.
18. 351 So. 2d 128 (La. 1977).
19. Id. at 131.
1982] 1231
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
legislature. The exemptions section of the LAPA specifically provides
that subsection 968F(4), part of the legislative oversight section, shall
not be applicable to the Public Service Commission." Judicial review
of Commission action, however, is to be provided by law." The
legislature has provided special legislation for appeals from Commis-
sion decisions," and has not made the judicial review provisions of
the LAPA applicable.
The conclusion that the LAPA was not directly applicable to the
rule-making activities of the Commission is only part of the court's
decision in the Consumer's League case. The Louisiana Supreme Court
also determined that although the Commission was not subject to
legislative control over the substance of its rules and the procedures
used in formulating them, this lack of control did not mean that the
Commission could do as it pleased. Article IV, section 21(B) of the
constitution authorizes the Commission to formulate "reasonable rules,
regulations and procedures." Not only the rule itself but also the pro-
cedures employed by the Commission, including the method by which
a rule is adopted, amended, or repealed, must be reasonable.
Reasonableness requires notice of the proposed change in the rule
and opportunity for interested people to comment.0 The court cited
no authority for its decision. The result, however, is consistent with
what appears to be emerging generally in the United States as a basic
requirement of administrative due process, even in rule-making
proceedings.' However, the court did refer by analogy to the LAPA
and its guidelines in determining reasonable procedures for changing
agency rules.'
The court found that the Commission did not give notice of the
rule change, or provide adequate opportunity for interested persons
to present their views. Therefore, the rule change was invalid and
the Commission was required to follow its own pre-existing rule un-
modified by the invalid amendment.
20. LA. R.S. 49:967 (Supp. 1978).
21. LA. CONST. art. IV, S 21(E).
22. See LA. R.S. 45:1192-1202.
23. 351 So. 2d at 128.
24. See generally Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note 1; Verkuil, A Study of Informal
Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CM. L. REv. 739 11976).
25.
Although we have concluded that the legislature may not constitutionally subject
the Commission to the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, these provisions, which govern the majority of the state agencies, do offer
guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable procedure by which the Commission
may implement rule changes.
351 So. 2d at 132 n.4.
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The court could have taken a different approach and determined
that while the legislature cannot dictate the substance of Commis-
ion rules, since that has been delegated to the Commission itself,
the legislature could prescribe a uniform procedure to be used by all
agencies in formulating rules. There is no indication that the constitu-
tional provisions were intended to exempt the Commission from purely
procedural requirements, or that the application of the LAPA would
substantialy interfere with the ability of the Commission to carry
out its constitutional duties. However, the court may have done in-
directly what it refused to do directly. By using the LAPA provi-
sions on rule-making as an example of "reasonable" procedures, the
court has indicated to agencies not within the LAPA that the Act
still may be used as a guide in determining the reasonableness of
agency procedures."
Should the Louisiana Supreme Court adhere to its decision that
constitutionally granted authority to adopt rules precludes efforts by
the legislature-to subject an agency to the rule-making provisions of
the LAPA, the court likely would exempt the State Civil Service Com-
mission and the City Civil Service Commission created under article
X, sections 1, 3, 4, 10, 12 of the 1974 Constitution." Under article
X, section 10 of the 1974 Constitution, "[ejach commission is vested
with broad and general rule-making .. .powers for the administra-
tion and regulation of the classified service." Again one might sug-
gest that the constitution delegates power to formulate substantive
rules to govern employment and does not preclude the legislature from
providing uniform procedural rules. This interpretation may be fur-
ther supported by the fact that the section which gives these com-
missions the power to make rules" does not use the word "pro-
cedures," as in the case of the Public Service Commission. Probably
these arguments would fail because of the explicit constitutional grant
of the rule-making power to the Commission.
In regard to adjudication and judicial review the constitution pro-
vides that "[ejach commission shall have the exclusive power to hear
and decide all removal and disciplinary cases."" Also, a right of ap-
peal to the commissions is provided in cases of alleged discrimination.,'
Seemingly these explicit provisions preclude application of the LAPA.
26. See text at notes 66-84, infra.
27. While the City Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over cities with a
population in excess of 400,000 (New Orleans) sections 4 and 14 provide an opportu-
nity for other cities to be included.
28. LA. CONST. art. X, S 10.
29. Id. S 12.
30. Id. S 8.
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Some indication that this suggestion would be the result is shown
in Flares v. State Department of Civil Services."' Appellant, claiming
to be an aggrieved person within subsection 49:964A, sought judicial
review of an alleged discriminatory denial of a veteran's preference.
The court found that the Constitution of 1921 gave the State Civil
Service Commission "the exclusive right to hear and decide matters
affecting classified employees who come within its provisions.""2 The
court concluded that such cases were not within the jurisdiction of
district courts, and that the LAPA did not give to the district court
appellate review of Commission decisions.'
The discussion of the applicability of the LAPA has focused on
whether a particular governmental entity is an "Agency" within the
Act. A state entity may be classified as an agency within the Act,
while not all of its activities may be controlled by the Act. Agency
activities must qualify as either rule-making or adjudication to come
within the Act; agency activities which do not qualify as either are
not within the Act. 4 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court has applied
the LAPA to the Department of Corrections in the conduct of
disciplinary hearings.' However, decisions to deny parole by the Board
of Parole, which is an independent board within the Department of
Corrections, were held in Smith v. Dunn8 not to be within the Act.
The issue in Dunn related solely to the applicability of certain provi-
sions of the LAPA to a person who had been denied parole. The. court
could have said that this action was not "rule-making," nor was it
"adjudication" resulting in a "decision" as defined in the Act. 7 In-
stead, the court spoke in unnecessarily sweeping terms and based its
decision on the conclusion that the Parole Board "is not the usual
administrative agency."' But what about the activities of the Board
31. 308 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 1st Cir.), ur-its denied, 310 So. 2d 855 (La. 1975). The
case was decided under the constitution of 1921, but should not be different under
the 1974 constitution.
32. LA. CONST. art. XIV, S 15 (1921, repealed 1974).
33. See Baler, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Administrative Law and Procedure, 36 LA. L. REv. 464, 472 (1976).
34. However, the LAPA does provide for an additional form of agency action-
declaratory orders. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 49:962 (Supp. 1966). See also the discussion of
declaratory orders in Section IV of this article.
35. State ex rel. Armistead v. Phelps, 365 So. 2d 468 (La. 1978).
36. 263 La. 599, 268 So. 2d 670 (1972).
37. See Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note 1, at 762.
38. "The two laws are entirely different, and indeed their provisions are so con-
flicting as to be irreconcilable." 263 La. at 602, 268 So. 2d at 671. The court here
was referring primarily to the confidentiality of Board records and the finality of the
Board's decisions.
A comparision of the law on parole with the law on administrative procedure
makes it clear that the Board of Parole is not the sort of agency or board con-
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when it seeks to revoke a parole? The process described in the sec-
tion on parole revocation" seems to result in a "decision" based on
"adjudication" and could be subject to the Act without the irrecon-
cilable differences adverted to in the case involving grant of parole.
From a due process view, grant and revocation of parole are substan-
tially different.'"
The final matter to be discussed involves the exclusion of political
subdivisions and their creations from the definition of "Agency." The
definition of "Agency" does not include "political subdivisions, as
defined in article VI, section 44 of the Louisiana Constitution, and
any board, commission, department, .agency, or other entity there-
of. . . ."" That section of the constitution states that "'political sub-
division' means a parish, municipality, and any other 'unit of local
government, including a school board and a special district, author-
ized by law to perform governmental functions."'" This part of the
definition of "Agency" was added in 1979."1 Earlier, the court of appeal,
in Quinn v. Department of Health," a case dealing with an appeal from
a City Civil Service Commission decision, held that "the Administrative
Procedure Act does not except the Commission from its applicability,
. . . ." The court applied the ten day rehearing provision of section
959 to calculate the time for appeal. No reference was made in Quinn
to the Flores case which had indicated that the LAPA was not ap-
plicable to constitutionally created civil service commissions to which
extensive powers had been delegated. In a subsequent case, the same
court followed Quinn.5 One judge dissented, not by reliance on Flores,
but on the ground that the Civil Service Commission of the City of
New Orleans is not included in the definition of "Agency," hence, none
of the provisions, including rehearing, applied.
The same court in another decision indicated some uncertainty
as to the applicability of the LAPA to other "local" agencies such
as zoning boards." Citing numerous cases, the court said "[clourts,
templated as subject to the law on general administrative procedure and that
the special provisions in Title 15 creating the Board of Parole and setting out
its powers and duties are not complementary or supplementary to the general
administrative rules of procedure.
263 La. at 604, 268 So. 2d at 671-72 (emphasis added).
39. LA. R.S. 15:574.9 (Supp. 1968).
40. Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1 (1979) with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
41. LA. R.S. 49:951(2) (Supp. 1979).
42. LA, CONST. art. VI, S 44.
43. 1979 La. Acts, No. 578, S 1.
44. 347 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
45. Paulin v. Department of Sanitation, 383 So. 2d 1064 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
46. Gertler v. City of New Orleans, 346 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977.
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on occasion have characterized a zoning board as an 'administrative
agency' . .. [and] have used the language of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act in adjudication of matters stemming from a decision (if
a zoning board."" However, the court acknowledged that the LAPA
applied to state governmental entities and not necessarily to municipal
administrative boards. The issue was whether the court should
"analogize the zoning board to 'state' boards" and thus apply the
language of the Act. Without specifically answering the question, the
court appears to follow the LAPA. Thus, even though the LAPA is
not necessarily applicable, the court looked to its terms for guidance.
The Act then exerts an influence on administrative procedures even
when it is not necessarily applicable to the agency or proceeding.
In Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension," a case which
involved an appeal from a decision by the Board of Trustees of the
Police Pension Fund of the City of New Orleans, the court of appeal
again, without determining that the LAPA was applicable, used the
Act by analogy. However, the court declined the opportunity under
subsection 49:964G to remand the case to the agency because of an
inadequate agency record. Instead, the court reversed the trial court
in the interests of judicial economy.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. 9 The court first addressed
the question of whether the LAPA was applicable to the Board. The
court found that an act of the legislature designated the composition
of the Board; the Board itself made its own operating rules. The court
held that the Board was a state "Agency" within the meaning of the
Act.' The Board was created by the legislature and derived its
authority from it. The conclusion that the Board was a state agency
receives some collateral support from article X, section 27 of the 1974
Constitution, which provides that the legislature shall provide for the
retirement of officials and employees of the state and political
subdivisions.
How then does this decision, which was decided before the 1979
amendment, square with the exclusion of political subdivisions and
their entities from the definition of "Agency"? From a simplistic view,
one might say that the two are compatible. Apparently no problem
is presented in determining what is a political subdivision under arti-
cle VI, section 44 of the 1974 Constitution. However, the definition
of "Agency" in the LAPA excludes not only political subdivisions but
47. Id. at 234.
48. 360 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
49. 367 So. 2d 849 (La. 1979).
50. The remainder of the decision, which deals with appellate review, will be
discussed later. See text at notes 255-57, infra.
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also entities thereof. What is meant by the term "entity thereof"? Is
it an entity created by the political subdivision or one which is funded
locally and operates solely within the bounds of, and with regard to,
a matter over which the political subdivision has a special interest
or responsibility, as distinguished from the state at large?
One might apply the Buras test and ask who created the entity
and defined its powers. Thus, if the legislature created a board and
empowered it to act, the board would be a state agency. If a parish
or municipality created it and empowered it to act, it would be an
entity of a political subdivision and not within the definition of
"Agency." Since the supreme court in Buras used a "creation" test,
it will likely continue to do so. One might suggest that even before
the amendment excluding political subdivisions and their entities,
distinguishing between state and local agencies was necessary. Prior
to the amendment, the LAPA was applicable only to "each state board,
etc.,""1 which required courts to distinguish between state and non-
state, that is, between state and local entities. Cases decided by the
various courts of appeal also have suggested that the LAPA was not
applicable to local entities.'
However, a hybrid exists. Numerous state statutes authorize
political subdivisions to create specified agencies." Louisiana Revised
Statutes sections 33:101-130.18 authorize political subdivisions to create
planning commissions. This statutory scheme is quite comprehensive
and provides for the number of commissioners, powers of the com-
mission and procedures to be followed. Is such a commission a state
agency or an entity of the local subdivision which creates it? Admit-
tedly, the entity is given life by the local ordinance which creates
it. However, the state has manifested a substantial interest in defin-
ing the powers and procedures to be followed. The state has authorized
its creation. Whether the state intends the LAPA to apply is not clear
from the present statute.
III. PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
A. Background
Several important statutes in Louisiana are designed to give the
public access to and information about the functioning of state and
local government. These include a Public Meetings (.'Sunshine") Law,"
51. LA. R.S. 49:951 (Supp. 1966) (emphasis added).
52. See Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Local Government Law,
41 LA. L. REV. 483, 486 (1981).
53. See, .e.g.. LA. R.S. 33:121-127 (1950): 33:140.1-140.59 (Supp. 1962).
54. LA.,R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1976).
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and a Public Records Law.' As its title suggests, the Public Meetings
Law, by declaring, subject to certain exceptions, that "[elvery meeting
of any public body shall be open to the public . . .", requires public
bodies to meet and conduct their business under public view."6 Simi-
larly, the Public Records Law gives members of the public the right
to examine and copy documents which are included within the defini-
tion of "public records."57
The Public Meetings Law and the Public Records Law are not
part of the LAPA and are, therefore, beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. However, the LAPA does contain provisions which relate to public
access to information. These provisions fall into several categories.
First, some sections give the public the right to learn about agency
organization, procedures and about actions which the agency has taken.
Second, some provisions require agencies, prior to taking action, to
give notice to the public or to those who might be affected by agency
action.
The original LAPA called upon each agency to publish a descrip-
tion of its own organization and procedures and to make available
for public inspection all rules, policy statements, decisions, orders, etc.'
This section did not provide for the place or manner of publication.
Section 953 provided that advance notice had to be given to interested
parties and the public .at large before agencies could adopt, amend
or repeal any of their rules. Notice was to be given by publication
at least once in the official Louisiana journal. Finally each agency was
required to file in the office of Secretary of State all existing rules
as well as all rules adopted after the effective date of the Act. The
Secretary of State was directed to keep a permanent compilation of
all agency rules"' which was to be made available upon request to
state agencies and officials and to members of the public.
In 1974 the role of the office of the Secretary of State was deleted
from the LAPA and the responsibility for receiving newly adopted
rules was vested in the Division of Administration.". Agencies were
directed to file a certified copy of each rule adopted, as well as all
rules existing on January 1, 1975. Furthermore, the amendment
created a new state publication to be known as the Louisiana
Register.' The Division of Administration was directed to publish a
55. LA. R.S. 44:1 (1950).
56. LA. R.S. 42:5 (Supp. 1976).
57. LA. R.S. 44:31 (Supp. 1978).
58. LA. R.S. 49:952 (Supp. 1966).
59. Id. S 954 (Supp. 1966, 1968, 1974, 1975 & 1978).
60. 1974 La. Acts, No. 284, S 1, amending LA. R.S. 49:951, 953 & 954, and adding
LA. R.S. 49:954.1.
61. Id.
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monthly bulletin which was to contain the notices and rules submit-
ted by agencies. Agencies were required to publish notice at least
once of intention to adopt, amend or repeal a rule in the Louisiana
Register and the official Louisiana journal. In 1978 the requirement
that notice be published in the official Louisiana journal was deleted."
The 1974 amendment also added a new section to the Act. Section
49:954.1 directed the Division of Administration to "compile, index,
and publish a publication to be known as the Louisiana Administrative
Code containing all effective rules adopted by each agency subject
to the provisions of ... " the LAPA "and all boards, Commissions,
agencies and departments of the executive branch." The Ad-
ministrative Code should also contain executive orders. Section 954.1
requires the Code to be supplemented at least every two years.63
In the 1974 amendment the governor is designated as the
publisher of both the Louisiana Administrative Code and the Loui-
siana Register through the Division of Administration. To implement
the 1974 amendment the governor on August 28, 1974, created a
"department within the Executive Department, Office of the Gover-
nor, to be known as the Department of the State Register. ... ,
The Department of the State Register is charged with assimilating
and editing the various documents necessary for the State Register
and the Administrative Code. These documents are to be supplied
to the Division of Administration for publication.
Finally, in 1978, the LAPA was once again amended. The amend-
ment placed direct responsibility for the publication of the Ad-
ministrative Code and the Louisiana Register in the Department of
the State Register. 5
B. Current Statutes
As the statute stands presently, "[t]he Department of the State
Register shall compile, index, and publish . . . the Louisiana Ad-
ministrative Code, containing all effective rules adopted by each
agency subject to the provisions of this Chapter and all boards, com-
missions, agencies and departments of the executive branch, notwith-
standing any other provision of law to the contrary."" Since the
supreme court has held that the Public Service Commission is not
bound by the rule-making provisions of the LAPA, one might ques-
62. 1978 La. Acts, No. 357, S 1, amending LA. R.S. 49:953.
63. The 1974 amendment was probably enacted to comply with requirements of
the new constitution. See LA. CONST. art. XII, S 14.
64. La. Exec. Order No. 73 (Aug. 28, 1974).
65. 1978 La. Acts, No. 252, S 1.
66. LA. R.S. 49:954.1A (Supp. 1974, 1975, 1976 & 1978).
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tion whether it should be required to supply its rules to the Depart-
ment of the State Register for inclusion in the Code. The Code has
nothing to do with the rule-making process or validity of a rule. Fur-
thermore, the constitution in article XII, section 14 explicitly provides
that "[riules, regulations, and procedures adopted by all state ad-
ministrative and quasi-judicial agencies, boards, and commissions shall
be published in one or more codes and made available to the public."
This constitutional provision seems to be all-inclusive and, since it does
not conflict with the rule-making powers, would seem to require the
inclusion of the Commission's rules in the Code.
At least once a month the Department of the State Register is
required to publish the Louisiana Register which contains all rules
which have been filed during the preceding month, notices required
to be submitted by the Act, and executive orders issued by the gover.-
nor during the preceding month." The Department may also include
"digests or summaries of new or proposed rules" 8 but the rule itself
shall prevail in case of any conflict with the digested version. The
Department can create the format for implementing the Code,"9 and
can require agencies to comply with its guidelines."0 Both the Register
and the Code are intended for dissemination to state agencies (at no
charge) and to others at a reasonable cost."'
In addition to providing for the Register and the Code, the LAPA
requires the filing with the Department of the State Register of an
organizational and operational description, and of the "methods
whereby the public may obtain information or make submissions or
requests." Agencies themselves must make available for public inspec-
tion all of their rules, written policy statements or interpretations
as well as their "final orders, decisions and opinions."72
Another aspect of public access to information is notice. Agen-
cies, prior to adopting, amending or repealing a rule must'give fif-
teen days notice. This requirement includes publication at least once
in the Register. Furthermore, notice also must be mailed to all per-
sons who have requested notice.7" All rules which are adopted must
67. Id. S 954.1B.
68. Id.
69. Id. S 954.1E.
70. Id. However, the Department of the State Register has the discretion to omit
unduly lengthy rules as long as copies are available from the adopting agency and
the Register or Code contains a reference to the subject matter of the missing rule,
and states how a copy can be obtained. Id. S 954.1C.
71. Id. S 954.1D.
72. Id. S 952 (Supp. 1966, 1978 & 1979).
73. Id. S 953 (Supp. 1966, 1974, 1975, 1976 & 1978).
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be filed with the Department of the State Register,' which in turn
is obligated to publish them in the Louisiana Register and ultimately
in the Administrative Code. 5 The informational and notice provisions
of the Act are very important since section 954 renders ineffective
and unenforceable rules adopted in violation of the LAPA
During the past five years progress had been made in regard to
compliance with the sections of the LAPA which deal with public ac-
cess to information. In the spring of 1975 reportedly few agencies
had filed their rules with the secretary of state as the law then pro-
vided. As a matter of fact, one commentator noted that "only twenty-
seven of over 250 agencies filed with the Secretary of State . ... .,1
However, in 1974 the legislature amended the LAPA and substituted
the Division of Administration-in the governor's office for the office
of Secretary of State. The change was made because the governor
would be in a better position to secure compliance, especially from
those department heads he had appointed." Also, the governor created
the Department of the State Register to see that the rules were ac-
quired and published. At that time some agencies had no written rules,
some rules were only partially written, and some written rules were
in a very disorganized format.79 In recent years the situation has im-
proved. The former director of the Department of the State Register
has stated that virtually every agency has submitted its rules and
regularly submits new rules and rule changes as required by the Act.
Furthermore, he estimates that 98 percent or more of the agencies
subject to the Act are in compliance."
However, there still is no Administrative Code. Commonly, APA's
include a provision for an administrative code.8 A recent study report-
ing on a 1979 survey states "that thirty-eight of the fifty states have
now either published codes or are preparing to do so."'
The law in Louisiana is clear. Both the constitution and the LAPA
74. Id. S 954 (Supp. 1966, 1968, 1974, 1975 & 1978).
75. Id. S 954.1 (Supp. 1974, 1975, 1976 & 1978).
76. This matter is discussed more fully later in Section IV of this article.
77. "New" LAPA, supra note 1, at 638.
78. Interview with E. Coltharp, former Director of the Department of the State
Register (June 10, 1981).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Such provisions are found in the Revised Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, S 5 and in the proposed new Model State Act, S 2-101(d). The Federal
Government publishes a Code of Federal Regulations.
82. Tseng & Pedersen, Commentary: Acquisition of State Administrative Rules and
Regulations-Update 1979, 31 AD. L. Ri~v. 405, 405-06 (1979). Although the study is not
completely accurate (Louisiana, for instance, is listed as "under compilation"), it shows
that there are administrative codes available in at least thirty-three states.
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obligate the state to publish a Louisiana Administrative Code. This
is the trend in other states. When the LAPA was first adopted there
were some problems brought about by a lack of agency compliance
with filing requirements. The lack of compliance arose partially
because many agencies did not have well organized, written, clear
expressions of their rules." With the high rate of compliance which
exists presently and with improvement in the quality and completeness
of akency written rules, to move forward with the Code at this time
would seem feasible."
IV. RULE-MAKING
A. The Definition of "Rule" and "Rule-Making"
The two areas of agency action which are subjected to procedural
requirements under the LAPA are "rule-making" and "adjudication."
"'Rule-making' means the process employed by an agency for the for-
mulation of a rule."' The definition explicitly excludes statements of
law or policy which are made in an agency decision of a contested
case before it. Announcement of rules in a decision to resolve a
disputed set of facts before an agency does not require compliance
with LAPA provisions on rule-making. To understand the meaning
of rule-making an examination of the definition of the term "rule" is
necessary. The LAPA defines the term "rule" in a precise manner:
'Rule' means each agency statement, guide, or requirement for
conduct or action, exclusive of those regulating only the internal
management of the agency, which has general applicability and
the effect of implementing or interpreting substantive law or
policy, or which prescribes the procedure or practice requirements
of the agency. 'Rule' includes but is not limited to, any provision
for fees, fines, prices or penalties, the attainment or loss of
preferential status, and the criteria or qualifications for licensure
or certification by an agency. A rule may be of general applicability
even though it may not apply to the entire state, provided its
form is general and it is capable of being applied to every member
of an identifiable class. The term includes the amendment or repeal
83. As early as 1974, consideration was given to the "possible Implementation
of a State Register" (La. Legislative Council Memorandum April 2, 1974 to Edgar
Coltharp, Division of Administration), but because of the problems mentioned above
it was not deemed feasible to begin work on the Code.
84. While the absence of a Code has not yet appeared to present serious legal
problems for state agencies, some difficulties may be presented in the future. See
Tate v. Livingston Parish School Board, 391 So. 2d 1240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), il-
lustrating that the unavailability of a code may hamper the determination of whether
a relevant agency rule exists.
85. LA. R.S. 49:951(7) (Supp. 1966, 1974, 1975, 1978 & 1979).
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of an existing rule but does not include declaratory rulings or
orders."
Prior to achieving this present form the definitional provision of the
Act had been amended several times.
Scholars disagree about the precise definition of the term "rule"
and whether the term can be precisely defined. Professor Davis "would
avoid the difficulties inherent in any effort to define a 'rule' precisely
'by saying simply that adjudication resembles what courts do in
deciding cases, and that rulemaking resembles what legislatures do
in enacting statutes'.' '
Sometimes to determine whether agency action is rule-making or
adjudication is very important. In National Dairy Products Corpora-
tion v. Louisiana Milk Commission," the Commission refused a re-
quest to fix dock prices on fluid milk. The relevant statute required
a hearing and the Commission did hold hearings. The Commission con-
ceded, however, that if the proceedings were characterized as adjudica-
tion it had failed to comply with minimal procedural requirements.
86. Id. S 951(6).
87. The initial legislation used only the word "statement." An amendment in 1978
elaborated by adding "guide or requirement for conduct or action." That same amend-
ment introduced language which excluded from the definition rules which regulate
"only the internal management of the agency." At the same time it deleted language
which had excluded "intra-agency memoranda" from the definition. The exclusion of
intra-agency memos probably was too broad, and the exclusion of matters relating
to internal management should have been sufficient. The 1978 amendment deleted the
word "future" from the definition. Previously, the subsection included a "statement
of general applicability and the effect of implementing or interpreting." This change
does not seem to be a significant one. Finally, the amendment of 1978 added examples
of rules, which examples include fees, fines, prices, etc. 1978 La. Acts, No. 252, S 1,
amending LA. R.S. 49:951(6) (Supp. 1966, 1974 & 1975).
88. Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note 1, at 825 (citing 1 K. DAVIS. supra note 2, at
" 5.01, at 287). In an attempt to provide more guidance in understanding the rule-
making function, it has been suggested that
[olrdinary rulemaking results in a determination which
"a) Is prospective in operation AND
b) Has general application AND
c) Does not become concretely operative against an individual until there
has been a further proceeding involving that individual AND
d) Is applicable to a group or class subject to opening up to admit
new members AND
e) Involves general facts rather than facts peculiar to one individual
or situation AND
f) Is, as a generality, based on an exercise of judgment about future
results, rather than on a determination of past events."
Id. (citing W. GELHORN & C. BYSE. MANUAL FOR TEACHERS TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND COM-
MENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW V, 12-13 (6th ed. 1974)).
89. 236 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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However, the Commission contended that dock pricing is rule-making
and that the proceedings complied with procedures required in
rule-making.
The court of appeal, in upholding the position of the Commission,
relied in part on a subsection of the Act which authorizes agencies
to use their "experience, technical competence and specialized
knowledge in evaluating the evidence."" Although no evidence against
dock pricing was introduced at the latest hearing, such evidence was
introduced at a previous hearing and the transcript of that hearing
had been introduced as evidence at the subsequent hearing.
The court also relied on Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew.? In that
case, the lower court had held that an agency engaged in setting prices
can consider not only the evidence at the hearing but also facts subse-
quently submitted to it or disclosed by its own investigation. The
evidence in the record in the National Dairy Products Case, coupled
with the agency's expertise, was sufficient for the court to uphold
the agency action.
National Dairy Products suggests that where rule-making is in.-
volved one has no constitutional right to a hearing." Such statements
should be taken with care. Also, as will be developed later in this
section, the LAPA specifically provides for a hearing as a prerequisite
to effective rule-making. A determination of whether a particular agen-
cy action is adjudication or rule-making is sometimes difficult.
Sometimes drawing the line may not even be helpful. The more rele-
vant inquiry is what procedure is fair and expedient under the cir-
cumstances. A simplistic "no hearing is required under due process
for rule-making" is out of touch with current developments in the
area." Finally, as will be shown in the section on judicial review,
agency rule-making is subject to judicial review under a standard
which precludes arbitrary action.
B. Exclusions from the Definition of "Rule"
The LAPA definition of "rule" is very broad and contains only
two express exclusions. First, rules which regulate only the internal
management of the agency are excluded. Presumably, this relates to
internal matters which do not affect the public such as, for example,
vacation schedules. Also, this exclusion probably covers investigative
90. Id. at 600.
91. 16 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1936), affd, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
92. 236 So. 2d at 600.
93. See generally Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258. 289-93 (1978).
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and enforcement guidelines the disclosure of which would only pro-
vide an advantage for those who would use this information to cir-
cumvent the law. Finally, the exclusion probably applies to situations
where disclosure of agency policy would put the agency at a com-
petitive disadvantage in what is regarded as an essentially commer-
cial transaction.%
The second exclusion is of declaratory rulings or orders. The
LAPA provides: "[e]ach agency shall provide by rule for the filing
and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory orders and rul-
ings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule
or order of the agency.""1 Thus, the LAPA has a separate provision
for the process of securing declaratory orders, and delegates to the
agency the responsibility of devising appropriate procedures whereby
parties can seek and obtain declaratory orders.
One problem is presented by the declaratory order approach. In
contrast to rule-making, where all interested parties may have some
input, the declaratory order procedure is analogous to adjudication.
Since no established rules cover intervention in a case of adjudica-
tion, none are applicable to the declaratory order process except to
the extent that an agency sees fit to permit intervention. Presumably,
declaratory orders do not have the force of law as to non-intervening
third parties and their legal rights would not be foreclosed by the
issuance of a declaratory order.
C. The Making of Rules
There are several important aspects of the rule-making procedures
in the LAPA. These involve notice, hearing, publication of rules (that
is, a second notice requirement), effect of failure to comply with the
LAPA, and judicial review. Before these matters are discussed some
preliminary comments will be offered. Rules are promulgated by ad-
ministrative agencies as either expressly or impliedly authorized by
the legislature (or the constitution if the agency is established in the con-
stitution, e.g., Public Service Commission," Civil Service Commission').
This power to make rules sometimes raises a constitutional problem as
to the legality and scope of the delegation of legislative power to the
agency. Usually even broad delegations are upheld." However, occa-
94. See Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note 1, at 839.
95. LA. R.S. 49:962 (Supp. 1966).
96. LA. CONST. art. IV, S 21(B).
97. LA. CONST. art. X. SS 7, 10(A)(1).
98. Louisiana Div. of Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Louisiana St.
Racing Comm'n, 391 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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sionally they are struck down." As to another matter, the Louisiana
courts have held that "administrative agencies are bound by their own
rules, especially those which affect the rights and liabilities of members
of the public."'
1. Notice of Intended Action
In regard to the adoption of agency rules, the LAPA requires
notice to be given twice: first, prior to the adoption of the rule and
second, once the rule has been adopted. Before a rule can be adopted,
amended or repealed the agency must "[g]ive at least fifteen days
notice of its intended action."'' The notice must be published in the
Louisiana Register at least once. Furthermore, notice must be mailed
to all people who have made .a timely request of the agency for such
notice. This notice must be mailed at the earliest possible time but
not later than the date the notice is submitted to the Louisiana
Register. The official date of notice is considered to be the date of
publication of the Louisiana Register, and more particularly, the date
on the first page of the issue."2
In Fairgrounds Corp. v. Louisiana State Racing Commission,"
Fairgrounds challenged the notice procedures used by the Commis-
sion prior to the adoption of a rule. On January 22, 24, and 25, 1972
the Commission gave notice that it intended ten days from the date
of publication to adopt one of two rules which had been submitted
to it. Interested persons were advised how, where and when to sub-
mit their views. On February 3, after hearing testimony, the Com-
mission voted not to adopt either rule. Subsequently on February 4,
5, and 7, the Commission again published a notice similar to the
previous one. The Commission without further notice adopted one of
the proposed rules at its April 21 meeting.
99. State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1980), struck down a provision of the
criminal law which allowed the Department of Health and Human Resources to add
drugs to the prohibited list when the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration
classified the drugs as dangerous. The subject of delegation is beyond the scope of
this article and will not be discussed further.
100. Central La. Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 377 So. 2d 1188, 1195
(La. 1977).
101. LA. R.S. 49:953A(1) (Supp. 1966, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978 & 1980).
102. The original Act provided for only ten days notice. In 1974 this was changed
to twenty days. 1974 La. Acts, No. 284, S 1. Finally another amendment introduced
the present fifteen day requirement. 1975 La. Act, No. 730, S 1. With the creation
of the Louisiana Register, amendments were adopted to require publication therein
and to dispense with the previous requirement that notice be published in the official
Louisiana journal.
103. 304 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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The court of appeal found that the Commission-had complied with
the notice requirements. The crux of the attack on the procedures
which had been used seemed to be that the Commission previously
had voted not to adopt either rule. However, the court held that an
agency can reinitiate rule-making procedures as long as it gives pro-
per notice. A complaint was also made that the Commission did not
act at the expiration of ten days as stated in the notice, but waited
until more than a month later. The matter had not even been placed
on the agenda until the meeting itself. However, the LAPA does not
require notice of when the vote will be taken, but only notice of pro-
posed action and information as to how interested parties may sub-
mit their- views. The notice given by the Commission complied with
these requirements. Fairgrounds was not entitled to personal notice
since its request was not timely. The court held that Fairgrounds had
ample time to present its views.
The case presents a problem, however, because the holding might
allow an agency to defer action on a matter which has aroused some
opposition and to wait to resolve it until the opposition is either not
present or not prepared to make an oral presentation to the agency.
Consideration might be given to setting an expiration time limit on
notice so that once notice has become stale, it must be republished.'
Furthermore, the present subsection on notice requires that the notice
contain the name of the person within the agency who must respond
to inquiries about the proposed action. An inquiry as to the date the
agency intended to consider and vote on the matter would be con-
sidered a relevant inquiry. A corresponding reply by the agency should
prevent surprise.
This subsection also specifies the contents of the notice. Notice
must contain "a statement of either the terms or substance of the
intended action or a description of the subjects and issues involved."
In 1980, the notice provision was amended to require in addition:
1. A statement approved by the Legislative Fiscal Office of any
fiscal impact of the proposed action or that there will be no fiscal
impact.
2. A statement approved by the Legislative Fiscal Office of any
economic impact of the proposed action or that there will be no
economic impact.'
These statements are to be prepared by the agencies themselves, and
submitted to the Legislative Fiscal Office for approval. They must
contain information about the "receipt, expenditure, or allocation of
104. It is not suggested that notice had become stale in the Fairgrounds case.
105. LA. R.S. 49:953A(1) (Supp. 1966), as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 392, S 1.
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state funds or funds of any political subdivision . . ." as well as cost-
benefit analyses of persons affected by the proposed action, and "an
estimate of the impact of the proposed action on competition and the
open market for employment . . ." etc.'
The provision in the original Act that the notice specify "the time
when, the place where, and the manner in which. interested persons
may present their views" has continued in force. As previously noted,
an amendment has added a requirement that the notice contain "the
name of the person within the agency who has the responsibility for
responding to inquiries about the intended action." ' 7
2. Hearing
The hearing requirement is a corollary of the "notice of intended
action" requirement. Section 953(A)(2) of the Act states that prior to
the adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule, an agency, after hav-
ing given notice, must "[aifford all interested persons reasonable op-
portunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing."
In the consideration of "substantive rules" oral presentation or argu-
ment must be allowed if so requested by twenty-five people, by a
government subdivision or agency, by an association of twenty-five
members or more, or by a committee of the legislature to which a
rule has been referred under the oversight provisions of section 968.
Some initial ambiguity appears in the provision which allows all
interested persons to submit their views orally or in writing. The
sentence which follows and provides when an oral hearing must be
granted seems to clarify that in other instances an agency has discre-
tion as to whether to allow oral presentations. While this section ap-
pears to give agencies some flexibility in using the rule-making proc-
ess, as few as twenty-five people or one organization with twenty-
five members will require an oral hearing. Thus, seemingly there may
not be as much flexibility as first appears.
Agencies are admonished to consider fully the matters submitted
to them concerning the proposed rule. Also, after adopting a rule,
agencies, if requested to do so thereafter within the prescribed time
limits (or before the adoption of the rule), must issue a brief state-.
ment of the reasons both for and against its adoption.
The Act, in Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:953B, contains provi-
sions which in emergencies allow an agency to act without complying
with the rules described above. This exemption does not apply to "any"
106. LA. R.S. 49:953A(3)(a), (b) (Supp. 1966, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978 & 1980).
107. Id. S 953A(1) (Supp. 1966, 1974, 1975, & 1976), as amended by 1978 La. Acts,
No. 252, S 1.
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emergency. Instead, the subsection is applicable only where the agency
"finds that an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare
requires adoption of a rule upon fewer than fifteen days notice ......
In such cases the agency may adopt a rule subject to the following
qualification. Within five days of adoption it must notify in writing
the governor, the attorney general, and the Department of the State
Register. The notice must state the reasons for the finding of "immi-
nent peril." When this procedure has been followed the agency can
proceed without prior notice and hearing or upon such notice and hear-
ing as is practicable. Notice of the emergency rule must be mailed
within five days of adoption to persons who have made timely re-
quests for notice of rule changes. Emergency rules and the reasons
for the finding of the emergency shall be published in full in the Loui-
siana Register.
Another feature of rule-making procedures authorizes any in-
terested person to petition and request an agency to adopt, amend
or repeal a rule, thus broadening public participation. Each agency
shall formulat- its procedures for entertaining such petitions. An
agency has ninety days from receipt to deny the petition in writing
or to commence rule-making proceedings.""
3. Effectiveness of Rules
The second notice requirement, that is, that a rule has been
adopted, amended or repealed, emanates from provisions which relate
to when a rule takes effect. The LAPA provides first that "[n]o rule
adopted on or after January 1, 1975 is valid unless adopted in substan-
tial compliance with . . ." the Act.'" Under section 954 every agency
which makes rules must "file a certified copy of its rules with the
Department of the State Register. No rule whether adopted before,
on, or after January 1, 1975 shall be effective, nor may it be enforced
unless it has been properly filed with the Department of the State
Register." Although little jurisprudence exists on point, in at least
two cases agencies were required to adopt or file rules. In Employers-
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Bernard,"' the trial court directed
the Commissioner of Insurance to adopt rules before proceeding fur-
ther. In Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Louisiana Insurance
Commission,'" when the Commission met to consider a matter, counsel
for an interested person objected to the proceeding by the Commis-
sion, because it had failed to adopt rules as required by the LAPA.
108. Id. S 953C.
109. Id. S 954A.
110. 286 So. 2d 445, 446 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
111. 336 So. 2d 239 (La. App. lst Cir. 1976).
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"[TJhe Commission decided to file the required rules and hold a hear-
ing under them.""
2
Other prerequisites must be met before a rule becomes effective.
After November 1, 1978, a rule does not become effective unless prior
to adoption the proposed 'change is submitted to a designated
legislative committee or to the presiding officers of the legislature
pursuant to the oversight provisions. Furthermore, after September
13, 1980, a rule does not become effective unless the approved fiscal
and economic impact statements have been filed with the Department
of the State Register and have been published in the Louisiana
Register.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:954, failure to give notice
precludes the enforcement of a rule. However, the "inadvertent failure"
to send the appropriate "notices" to a person who has requested notice
does not invalidate a rule. Also, a proceeding for a declaratory judg-
ment to challenge the validity or applicability of a rule on the grounds
that it "was adopted without substantial compliance with required rule-
making procedure" set forth in.the LAPA must be brought within
two years from the effective date of the rule."'
Rules become effective when, after their adoption, they are
published in the Louisiana Register, unless a later date is specified
either in a statute or in the rule itself."' Emergency rules become
effective on the date of their adoption or on a future date specified
by the agency which does not exceed sixty days, provided that the
required notice is given to the governor, attorney general and the
Department of the State Register."' An emergency rule expires with
the publication of the Louisiana Register in the month following the
month the rule is adopted unless the rule and reasons are published
in that issue of the Louisiana Register. Notwithstanding proper
publication in the Louisiana Register, an emergency rule expires not
later than 120 days after adoption. Agencies are admonished to make
emergency rules known to people who may be affected by them.
Finally, an agency may, subsequent to the adoption of an emergency
rule, adopt the identical, rule for permanent use by following the
regular procedures for adoption of rules."'
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that, to be effective, a
rule, even an emergency rule, must be published in the Louisiana
112. Id. at 241.
113. LA. R.S. 49:963 (Supp. 1966, 1968, 1974, 1975, 1978 & 1980).
114. Id. S 954B(2).
115. LA. R.S. 49:954(B)(2).
116. LA. R.S. 49:953A(l), (2), (3).
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Register. In State v. Hicks,"7 the court affirmed the quashing of an
indictment charging a defendant in a criminal case with the posses-
sion of a controlled dangerous substance. The substance involved was
Talwin, which was added to the Louisiana list of prohibited substances
by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Resources
after being classified as dangerous by the Federal Drug Enforcement
Administration. The court said that the Secretary must follow the
provisions of the LAPA.' Publication in the Louisiana Register did
not occur until April 20, 1979. Since the defendant was arrested on
March 11, 1979, the rule could not be enforced against him.9
V. ADJUDICATION
A. To Which Proceedings Do the LAPA Adjudication Rules Apply?
In contrast to those sections of the LAPA which deal with the
applicability of the Act, public access to information, and rule-making,
the procedures for adjudication, with one modest addition, remain un-
changed from those included in the original Act. The importance of
adjudicatory procedure cannot be overestimated.'0
Determining the applicability of the adjudication procedures of
the Act requires a careful statutory analysis. First of all, the LAPA
is not applicable every time an agency acts or makes. a decision. When
an agency exercises rule-making powers, it is not governed by the
provisions which relate to adjudication. However, the definition of ad-
judication, while broad, is not broad enough to encompass all agency
action which is not rule-making. Thus, some agency action is not within
the scope of the Act.
What is "adjudication?" "'Adjudication' means agency process for
the formulation of a decision or order."'' A "decision" or "order":
means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether af-
firmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any
117. 377 So. 2d 86 (La. 1979)..
118. See the discussion of State v. Rodriguez, supra note 99, and accompanying text.
119. 377 So. 2d at 87.
120. As one commentator has put it:
Procedure is one of the methods through which the protection of public and private
interests can be assured in administrative adjudications.
The need for procedural safeguards to protect individual rights is greater
on the adjudicatory level than in rulemaking. While rulemaking is essentially a
quasi-legislative function, agency adjudication takes on a quasi-judicial aspect and
must contain procedural safeguards similar to those required in court procedure,
since individual rights are being determined.
Adams, State Administrative Procedure: The Role of Intervention and Discovery in Ad-
judicatory Hearings, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 856-57 (1980).
121. LA. R.S, 49:951(1) (Supp. 1966, 1974, 1975, 1978 & 1979).
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agency, in any matter other than rule-making, required by con-
stitution or statute to. be determined on the record after notice and
opportunity for an agency hearing, and including non-revenue
licensing, when the grant, denial or renewal of a license is re-
quired by constitution or statute to be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing.'
Thus, the meaning of adjudication and the applicability of the LAPA's
rule on adjudication depend on the meaning of the terms "decision"
or "order." The Act indicates that these terms include any final disposi-
tion by an agency other than rule-making. However, the definition
includes an important qualification. The adjudication rules of the
LAPA apply only to those final dispositions required by constitution,'
or by some other statute,' to be determined on the record after notice
and opportunity for a hearing. One cannot determine to which pro-
ceeding the LAPA adjudication rules apply simply by examining the
Act alone. To determine whether the rules may apply one must look
to the "due process" requirements of the United States and Louisiana
Constitutions and to the various statutes which authorize agency ac.-
tion. The adjudication provisions of the LAPA are not self-executing;
they do not create a right to notice and hearing. The procedures come
into play only when some other law requires that agency action be
on the record after notice and hearing.
During the past ten years, the applicability of due process re-
quirements to administrative proceedings and an increased sensitiv-
ity to individual rights has seen both federal and state courts strike
down arbitrary agency action.' In Louisiana, Tafaro's Investment Co.
122. Id. S 95113) (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); LA. CONST. art. X, S 5.
124. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 23:1628-1634 (1950).
125. The following cases demonstrates the varities of agency actions and procedures
which have been held by federal and state courts to a standard of due process. Mar-
shall v. Jerrico, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1610 (1980); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy. 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Precious Metals Associates, Inc. v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 620 F.2d 900 (Ist Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Health & Hospital
Corp. of Marion County, 620 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1980); Harper v. Lindsay, 616 F.2d
849 (5th Cir. 1980); Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980); Bakersfield City
School Dist. of Kern County v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1979); Georator Corp.
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1979); Standard Oil
Co. v. F.T.C., 475 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555
(M.D.N.C. 1978); Sima Prods. Corp. v. McLucas, 460 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. III. 1978); Sneaker
Circus Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Floulis, 457
F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Medical Services Administration v. Duke, 378 So. 2d
685 (Ala. 1979); Rosenberg v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 118 Ariz. 489, 578 P.2d 168 (1978);
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v. Division of Housing Improvement'2 discussed generally the ap-
plicability of procedural due process in administrative proceedings:
A determination of the applicability of the requirements of
procedural due process to the administrative process is generally
based upon the distinction between legislative and judicial func-
tions. If the activity of the administrative body tends to assimilate
the exercise of the legislative function, then procedural due proc-
ess is not demanded since no such limitation is placed upon the
legislature itself. If, however, a judicial function is involved, an
analogy to judicial process is made, and the procedural safeguards
developed in the administration of justice must be observed.
[A]Il would agree that where, as in the instant case, the
administrative agency adjudicates private property rights and
obligations, the parties must be afforded an opportunity to be
heard. Where private rights cannot otherwise be protected and
there is no compelling public interest for summary action, there
must be a full hearing before administrative action.'"
This case considered a section of the Code of the City of New
Orleans which authorized the Administrator of the Division of Hous-
ing Improvement, among other things, to have a dwelling repaired
at the cost of the owner. The court held that due process required.
reasonable notice and a full hearing before the Administrator could
act. The Code provided for notice and hearing and those procedures
had not been followed by the Administrator.' The application of fair
procedures under the due process doctrine to cases involving private
"property" rights has been expanded to include "non-traditional" no-
tions of property as well as privileges and other entitlements.,'
Some cases, however, have held that a person does not have a
right to a hearing before an agency may act. One of these is First
Horn v. County of Ventura, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 596 P.2d 1134 (1979); Adamchek v.
Board of Educ. of Stamford, 174 Conn. 366, 387 A.2d 556 (1978); Continential Oil Co.
v. Board of Labor Appeals, 582 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1978); Steele v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1978); La Petite Auberge v.
Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274 (R.I. 1980); Tasker v. Mohn,
267 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1980).
The matter is discussed in Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property". Adjudicatory
Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977), and Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews
v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 28 (1976).
126. 261 La. 183, 259 So. 2d 57 (1972).
127. 261 La. at 190-91, 259 So. 2d at 60.
128. Parker v. Board of Barber Examiners, 261 La. at 199, 259 So. 2d at 63.
129. See note 125, supra.
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National Bank of Abbeville v. Sehrt.1° Three banks operating in the
Abbeville area sought to enjoin the State Bank Commissioner from
authorizing a new bank to operate in the area. They had asked the
Commissioner for a formal hearing. The Commissioner denied the re-
quest but did have an "informal hearing" in his office in which plain-
tiffs were allowed to present their opposition. Plaintiffs claimed that
the decision to authorize the new bank without giving them a formal
hearing was arbitrary, capricious, and denied them due process. The
court stated that the LAPA does not itself create a right to a hear-
ing. That right must come from some other source, statutory or con-
stitutional. In this case no statute required the Commissioner to hold
hearings. He was merely directed to examine the qualifications of the
applicant and to refuse permission to a new bank if granting the
authority was not in the public interest.
Similarly, the court found no denial of due process because that
clause cannot be used to prevent competition. Opening another bank
in the area would not deprive the plaintiffs of property. "Plaintiffs
have no vested interest in the banking business of their area, and
hold no exclusive franchise."'' Due process is satisfied by providing
judicial review. Upon review, the court found substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner's conclusion. The court also noted that in
giving plaintiffs an informal hearing, the Commissioner did more than
he was required to do. One judge in dissent argued that the LAPA
should be liberally interpreted as providing for a hearing in these
types of cases.'"
A variation on these bank cases was presented in Hagood v.
Pickering.3 Here again an application for a certificate of authority
to organize a bank was presented to the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions. However, in this case, the Commissioner, after several
informal meetings, denied the application. The Commissioner was
under no statutory obligation to grant a hearing, and the court of
appeal held that there was no denial of due process. The court relied
on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,'" which stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must clearly
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
130. 246 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs refused, 258 La. 909, 248 So. 2d 334
(1971).
131. Id. at 384.
132. See also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Concordia Vidalia v. Smith, 327 So.
2d 657 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writs refused upon similar reasoning, Delta Bank &
Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So. 2d 330 (La. 1980).
133. 385 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
134. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an indepen-
dent source such as state law."5
In the case at bar the court noted that the applicant was not
automatically entitled to a certificate upon meeting certain conditions.
The Commissioner had the discretion to grant or deny the applica-
tion as would best serve the public interest.
On a quite different matter, that of denial of parole, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana has held that the LAPA was not applicable to such
proceedings and that people who were denied parole had no right to
a statement of reasons for the denial.13 Although not relied on by
the court, one possible rationale for the decision is that no statute
requires that such decisions be made on the record after notice and
hearing. Since the matter is committed to the discretion of the Board,
as in the previous cases, there is no due process right to a hearing.
Since there is no right to a hearing, the adjudicatory rules of the
LAPA, including section 958 which requires findings of facts, do not
apply.'37 However, the LAPA was applied to prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings conducted under the rules of the Department of Corrections."
1. Suspension of Licenses
The applicability of adjudication rules to driver's license suspen-
sion and revocation is somewhat muddled.'39 An Attorney General's
Opinion'40 states that the LAPA is not applicable to the "suspension,
revocation and cancellation" of driver's licenses by the Department
of Public Safety because the statutory provision, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 32:414,1' authorizes suspension prior to notice and hearing.
In Price v. State, Department of Public Safety, License Control & Driver
Improvement,"' a case involving a suspension under section 414, the
135. Id. at 577.
136. Smith v. Dunn, 263 La. 599, 268 So. 2d 670 (1972).
137. See Bonfield. Adjudication, supra note 1, at 36243. 357-59.
138. State ex rel. Armistead v. Phelps, 365 So. 2d 468 (La. 1978).
139. See Note, Due Process For Drivers Under the Louisiana Revocation Statutes,
36 LA. L. REv. 852 (1976).
140. 1973 LA. Op. ATT'Y GFN. No. 75-89 (Oct. 30, 1973). This opinion is not contained
in the bound volume of opinions issued for 1973. It is cited several times in the an-
notations to the LAPA. For example, see note 1 to section 967 in the 1981 West
Supplement.
141. LA. R.S. 32:414 (Supp. 1981).
142. 325 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
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court of appeal held that the LAPA is applicable only where a statute
provides for notice and hearing prior to administrative determination.
The court relied on First National Bank of Abbeville."' The Depart-
ment of Public Safety is a state agency within the meaning of the
LAPA; however section 414 proceedings are not subject to the LAPA.
Due process is achieved through judicial review.
In the case of Turner v. State Department of Public Safety,"'
another driver's license suspension case, the 'court did apply the
evidentiary rule of the LAPA, section 956, and found the quality of
evidence was insufficient to meet the "probative value" test. Further-
more, it Jound that the Implied Consent Law,"' under which the
suspension was imposed, set an even higher evidentiary standard: that
there be sworn evidence of the fact in question. In that case there
was no evidence to show a factual basis for the officer's belief that
the operator of the vehicle was under the influence of liquor as re-
quired by the Implied Consent Law. Notably, however, unlike section
414, the Implied Consent Law gives a driver whose license is suspend-
ed an after-the-fact right to an administrative hearing.' 6 Does this pre-
sent a sufficiently different situation than the Price case which says
outright that section 414 provides no requirement for an administrative
hearing, and that the LAPA is inapplicable? Does Turner stand for
the proposition that the adjudication rules of the LAPA will apply
in an administrative suspension hearing whether it is before or after
the fact? Some occasions, such as emergencies, require that an agen-
cy act first and adjudicate afterwards."" Is there any reason why in
emergencies the rules of adjudication should not apply to an after-
the-fact administrative hearing? One argument to the contrary can
be found in section 961 of the LAPA, which specifically deals with
the application of the adjudication rules to proceedings involving
licenses. Subsection 961A, for example, applies the adjudication rules
where the "grant, denial or renewal of a license is required to be
preceded by notice and 'opportunity for hearing ..... " But this subsec-
tion does not seem to include suspension and revocation proceedings.
Subsection 961B provides that when a licensee has applied for a
renewal or for a new license, the old license remains in effect until
the agency acts on the application. If the application is denied, the
old license is in effect until the last day for seeking review of the
agency's decision, or even later if the reviewing court so provides.
143. 246 So. 2d 382, discussed at note 130, supra, and accompanying text.
144. 350 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
145. LA. R.S. 32:661-668 (Supp. 1968).
146. Id. S 668 (Supp. 1968, 1972, 1976 & 1978).
147. See Bonfield, Adjudication, supra note 1, at 322-24.
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Finally, subsection 961C specifically covers suspension and revoca-
tion of licenses. It provides:
No revocation, suspension, annulment or withdrawal of any
license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency pro-
ceedings the agency gives notice by mail to the licensee of facts
or conduct which warrant the intended action, and the licensee
is given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful re-
quirements for the retention of the license .14
Does this last provision bring into play the adjudication rules of
the LAPA? Probably not, since the legislature knew how to make
those rules applicable to licensing matters when it saw fit. Compar-
ing the language used in Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:961A ("the
provisions of this Chapter concerning adjudication shall apply") with
the wording of the procedural rights contained in subsection 961C,
one must conclude that in subsection 961C (and in subsection 961B
as well), the legislature intended to provide some protection to
licensees, but not the comprehensive procedures contained in the ad-
judication rules. In subsection 961B the legislature maintains the status
quo for the benefit of one already in possession of a license until the
agency acts on his application for renewal or for a new license, as
the case may be, and during the time he is given to seek judicial
review of a denial. Subsection 961C provides minimal due process by
saying that a license cannot be suspended or revoked without notice
and without giving the licensee an opportunity to show why he is
legally entitled to retain it. Even this subsection would seem to re-
quire notice and an opportunity to communicate information to the
licensing authority.
However, a qualification is found in subsection 961C:
If the agency finds that public health, safety, or welfare im-
peratively requires emergency action, and incorporates a finding
to that effect in its order, summary suspension of a license may
be ordered pending proceedings for revocation or other action.
These proceedings shall be promptly instituted and determined.
In driver license suspensions the United States Supreme Court
has held that to suspend a driver's license without a prior hearing
where the suspension follows automatically upon conviction of an of-
fense or a specified number of offenses is not a denial of due process.
Such cases do not usually involve disputed factual issues. 9 The Court
also has held that a suspension without prior notice and hearing can
be made in the case of arrestees who refuse to submit to chemical
148. (Emphasis added).
149. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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tests under implied consent statutes."5 The Court considered the
urgency in 'protecting the public interest in removing drunken drivers
from the road as sufficient ground to override the licensee's due proc-
ess argument. Of course, a licensee is ultimately entitled to notice
and some form of hearing before the agency or a court.5 '
These two Supreme Court cases dealt with the minimal re-
quirements of due process and not with statutory requirements such
as are contained in section 961. That provision is quite demanding.
The agency, itself, must find that public safety "imperatively requires
emergency action"'52 and it must specifically incorporate such a find-
ing in its order. Arguably, refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test
does not in itself render a person a public menace. Yet Louisiana
Revised Statutes 32:414 and 32:661 have been applied as though sec-
tion 961 of the LAPA were totally inapplicable. Undoubtedly, the
legislature has the power to exempt agency action from the LAPA.
But in this instance such action on the legislature's part is a mere
implication and not an express exception to the Act.'3 Prior notice
and hearing (perhaps even the applicability of some of the other rules)
may be required, however, where an agency seeks to suspend or
revoke a business or professional license."
License suspension cases pose the question whether the LAPA
provisions on judicial review should apply regardless of whether the
adjudication rules are applicable. One court of appeal answered in the
affirmative in 1974.15
B. Procedural Rules
1. Waiver
Section 955 of the LAPA contains the rules, other than those
which relate to evidence, which govern adjudications. This section
gives to a party a right to insist on certain procedures. It does not
impose the procedures on an unwilling party."'
150. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
151. Id.
152. LA. R.S. 49:961C (Supp. 1966) (emphasis added).
153. LA. R.S. 49:966B (Supp. 1966).
154. Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n v. Ehmig, 277 So. 2d 137 (La. 1973). "It has been the
uniform trend throughout the country in both federal and state courts to require that
a hearing be held prior to the revocation, suspension, or modification of an existing
license to engage in a business or profession." Id. at 139.
155. Young v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, License Control & Driver Improvement
Div., 298 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). This view was overruled in Price. Com-
pare the majority opinion in Jaubert v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 323 So. 2d 212 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975) with Judge Schott's dissenting opinion, id. at 216.
156. Thus, subsection 955A provides that "[i]n an adjudication, all parties who do
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2. Notice 0
The LAPA provides that notice shall be given to a "party," defined
as each person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly
seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a "party." The Act
is silent on who is "entitled as of right to be admitted as a party."
Would it include anyone who can satisfy the "injury in fact" test for
standing?" 7 Would it include anyone seeking to represent the "public
interest"? Except for "named" parties, the LAPA contains no "in-
tervention" rule defining who may become a party as a matter of
right or as a matter of grace."'
The notice provided in subsection 955B includes:
(1) A statement of the time, place and nature of the hearing;
(2) A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under
which the hearing is to be held;
(3) A reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules
involved;
(4) A short and plain statement of the matters asserted.
Some flexibility is provided whereby the initial statement can be
limited to the issues if that is all the agency can provide at the time,
subject to a duty to furnish more detailed notice upon request.
As to the hearing itself, subsection 955C states that all parties
have a right "to respond and present evidence on all issues of fact
involved and argument on all issues of law and policy involved." Par-
ties also have a right of cross-examination, but only to ensure "full
and true disclosure of the facts." Th'e presiding officer may limit cross-
examination to make the proceedings orderly and expeditious, but may
not completely prohibit all cross-examination.'69
not waive their rights shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable
notice." Subsection 955D allows informal disposition by stipulation, agreement or default.
In Brown v. Sutton, 356 So. 2d 965 (La. 1978), a case decided under a specific statutory
notice requirement, LA. R.S. 30:5C (1950 & Supp. 1960), and not under section 955, the
court found that the notice given was inadequate as to Brown. However, the court
also found that Brown and his counsel were aware that a hearing was forthcoming
and that there was sufficient time to inquire as to the specifics and to prepare a presen-
tation. The court held that lack of formal notice had been cured by actual notice. Fur-
thermore, the court said that "appearance in person or by attorney at an administrative
hearing waives any irregularity or imperfection in the service of notice." 356 So. 2d
at 972.
157. Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n v. Louisiana, 295 So. 2d 796 (La.
1974).
158. See, e.g., UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT S 4-209 (1981).
159. 1976 LA. Op. ATT-Y GEN. No. 75-1322 (Jan. 8, 1976).
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Subsection 955E provides for a record which shall consist of:
(1) All pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings;
(2) Evidence received or considered or a resume thereof if not
transcribed;
(3) A statement of matters officially noted except matters so
obvious that statement of them would serve no useful purpose;
(4) Offers of proof, objections, and rulings thereon;
(5) Proposed findings and exceptions;
(6) Any decision, opinion, or report by the officer presiding
at the hearing.
The agency must, according to subsection 955F, prepare a transcript
if so required by law or if requested by a party upon payment of
cost of preparation (unless the party is entitled to a copy at no charge).
Finally, subsection 955G admonishes that "[flindings of fact shall be
based exclusively on the evidence and matters officially noticed."
The rules applicable to notice and hearing may require some flex-
ibility in application. Strict adherence to the rules of pleading and
proof in judicial proceedings is not ordinarily required."
Regarding the notice requirement the Louisiana Supreme Court
has said in Tafaro's Investment Co. v. Division of Housing Improve-
ment that it
need only be reasonable and need not meet the exacting re-
quirements for notice in judicial proceedings. The type of notice
and the method of notice vary with the quality of the proceeding
and the results which can obtain after hearing. Notice must serve
the purpose of informing the parties of the nature and time of
the proceedings, the purpose of the hearing-i.e., the possible con-
sequences or the manner in which interests may be affected-,
and the method of presenting objection to the administrative
action.""
In that case, the court held that notice sent to the wrong address
and never received by the addressee does not comply with the notice
160.
Administrative proceedings are not ordinarily governed by the strict rules
of judicial proceedings. The key to pleading and procedure in that administrative
process is the opportunity to prepare .... Generally inadequacies in pleading
and notice may be cured if the record establishes a full hearing was had after
proper preparation.
White v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 259 La. 363, 378, 250 So. 2d 368, 373 (1971)
(citations omitted).
161. 261 La. 183, 191, 259 So. 2d 57, 60-61 (La. 1972).
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requirement, nor does a letter which advises a property owner that
a new ordinance has been passed authorizing the city to contract for
repairs and that the city "might" apply the ordinance if they do not
hear from the property owner. Also in this case no hearing was of-
fered to the owner before the agency made its decision to contract
for repairs. Thus, the action failed to comply with both the notice
and hearing requirements.
While some relaxation and informality are permitted in agency
proceedings, the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated in -White v. Loui-
siana Public Service Commission that "[e]ven though due process may
not require strict compliance with notice and pleading in administrative
proceedings, and even though injustice may not result in a particular
case, compliance with reasonable procedural rules is necessary for ef-
ficiency." At stake in this case was a license to operate a telephone
answering service in a certain part of the state. The court found that
there would be "competition and duplication of service" if one of the
applicants was granted a license. It also determined that the Com-
mission was obligated to hold "'a hearing on reasonable notice' to
determine whether the existing service is inadequate."'8 2
Notice of the "hearings" in question, which had been held
previously, was very general and beyond doubt failed to specify that
the existing service was inadequate. 118 Although the court stated that
it did not have to decide whether the LAPA applied to the Public
Service Commission,'" it did find that the manner of conducting the
hearing in question fell well below the standards set out in the LAPA.
However, a proper hearing could overcome defective notice. The court
concluded that a hearing was never held on the issue of "inadequacy
of service." The "meager evidence" in the record indicated that in-
adequacy of service was never an issue. Furthermore, nothing in the
record revealed that service was in fact inadequate. The case was
remanded to the Public Service Commission for a hearing on the cen-
tral issue."
3. A "Fair Hearing"
Decisions of the courts have contained strong statements on the
162. 259 La. 363. 377-78 n.3, 250 So. 2d 368, 373 n.3 (1971).
163. The court recognized that the Commission was authorized to make rules to
govern its proceedings, but since the rules were not offered in evidence declined to
take judicial notice of them. This is another reason why an Administrative Code would
be helpful.
164. See Section II, supra.
165. On the issue of notice, see Calhoun v. Administrator of the Department of Employ-
ment Security, 390 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), in which an administrative deci-
sion was reversed because it was based on a charge not included in the notice.
19821 1261
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
requirement for fairness in the administrative adjudication process.'
a. Evidentiary Rules
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:956 contains detailed rules which
relate to evidentiary considerations. These provisions include ad-
missibility of evidence, "judicial" notice, records and documents, sub-
poenas, discovery, and privileges. The courts have created some doubt
about the meaning of the rule contained in subsection 956(1), which
provides that: "agencies may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses. probative value commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." The broad
rule of admissibility has only one qualification: agencies must recognize
legally recognized privileges, and are authorized to exclude "incompe-
tent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence." To ex-
pedite matters and so long as no prejudice to parties results, agen-
cies may receive evidence in written form.
Obviously the drafters of the LAPA wanted to adopt a simple
test for determining both the admissibility and the probative effect
to be given to evidence. The drafters of the Act rejected the approach
used in the Revised Model APA. Section 10 of the Revised Model
APA provides that "rules of evidence as applied in non-jury civil cases
in District Court . . ." shall apply, subject to an escape clause that
"[w]hen necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof
under those rules, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admit-
ted ... if it is a type commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men
in the conduct of their affairs." Professor Dakin has explained why
the Model Act approach is undesirable,'." and his view prevailed in
the adoption of the LAPA.
166. For example, in King v. Brown, 115 So. 2d 405, 410 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959),
the court of appeal traced procedural due process back to the fall of Adam and Eve
and stated:
A "fair hearing" is synonymous with a "fair and impartial trial," and the terms,
at least, by strong implicaton, require a reasonable and substantial compliance
with the principle of due process of law. A "fair trial" includes the right to notice
of the charges one is to be confronted with, and the right of cross-examining
his accusers, and to examine and refute the evidence tendered against him. An
opportunity to be heard and to defend are essential elements of a fair hearing
and of due process. Due process of law means the due course of legal proceedings
and according to the rules and forms which have been established for the protec-
tion of private rights and refers to a law which hears before it condemns, and
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
167.
Inasmuch as researchers are generally unable to point to such a body of rules
as existing in any coherent sense like the exclusionary rules applicable to jury
trials, this would seem to accomplish very little. The model draftsmen would have
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The criterion for the admissibility of evidence and for establishing
the factual basis on which an agency may act seems to be a common
sense, straight-forward approach. Jefferson Downs, Inc. v. Louisiana
State Racing Commission,' involved a denial by the Racing Commis-
sion-of a request by Jefferson Downs for 105 racing days. The Com-
mission granted Jefferson Downs only fifty days. The fifty-five days
were denied because the Commission had granted a request from
Evangeline Downs for eighty-eight days. Since the dates requested
by the two tracks overlapped, only one track could be awarded those
dates. The Commission awarded the dates to Evangeline Downs
because when faced with conflicting requests it awarded dates on the
basis of alphabetical priority (lowest letter gets the dates). As to this
approach the court of appeal said: "This method cannot possibly with-
stand the test of reason and cannot be condoned."'' 9
Also, the court admonished the Commission "to comply assiduously
with the provisions of the administrative procedure act, including not
only the evidentiary requirements but also those relating to notice."
The court stated that Jefferson Downs was entitled to a hearing con-
ducted according to the adjudicatory and evidentiary rules of the
LAPA. "These statutes provide for an evidentiary hearing with pro-
per notice and for consideration by the Commission on issues of fact
based on competent probative evidence with full opportunity for ex-
amination and cross examination." 7 ' Notably, the court inserted the
word "competent" into the evidentiary rule, even though section 956
includes no such criterion. The Racing Commission, based upon their
"expertise and knowledge," decided that Jefferson Downs and
Evangeline Downs could not both successfully operate on the same
dates and used its alphabetical method for resolving the conflict.
Subsection 956(3) authorizes an agency to take judicial notice of facts
and "of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge." Yet, as pointed out by the court of
appeal:
the record of the hearing does not indicate that any staff report,
or any evidence or technical expertise information was supplied
been better advised to prescribe the Learned Hand rule that evidence shall be
"convincing evidence" of the type "on which responsible persons are accustomed
to rely in serious affairs." .... [Sluch a rule will be meaningful to the layman
upon whom we must depend to carry on the work of agency adjudication and
will result in about as much uniformity of evidence evaluation as can be achieved
in the administrative process.
Dakin, Revised APA, supra note 1, at 809-10.
168. 288 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
169. Id. at 656.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
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to the Commission upon which the Chairman or the Commission
members based. their predisposed observations. Lacking any
evidentiary foundation in the record, we are compelled to conclude
that a determination based on unsupported statements is
arbitrary.'
The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit dealt with a problem
of proof in a driver's license suspension case, Turner v. State Depart-
ment of Public Safety.' Under the applicable statutes, refusal to take
an implied consent sobriety test requires suspension of the driver's
license. However, as a prerequisite to suspension, certain events must
occur. For example, the officer must establish that he had reasonable
grounds to believe that the driver was under the influence of alcohol.
In Turner, the only evidence consisted of two statements: a sworn
statement and an unsworn accident report and complaint. The acci-
dent report and complaint contained information that plaintiff was driv-
ing on the wrong side of the road, was involved in an accident and
was verbally and physically abusive to the arresting officer. The sworn
statements contained no fact to justify the officer's belief that plain-
tiff was under the influence. No factual assertions were made as to
any odor of alcohol, unsteadiness or of any of the typical physical
characteristics of intoxication. The court of appeal, while readily
acknowledging the admissibility of copies of documents under the
LAPA, concluded that the accident report and complaint did not
possess probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men and should not be admissible under the LAPA. Neither docu-
ment shed any light on the basis for the officer's belief that the driver
was drunk. The court also said that despite the liberal admissibility
rules of the LAPA, the legislature can impose more demanding re-
quirements such as requiring that statements be submitted in sworn
form. The court found that the reasonable grounds for the officer's
belief, under the implied consent statute, must be submitted in sworn
form.
Earlier, in discussing the Jefferson Downs case,1 8 the writers observ-
ed that the court inserted the word "competent" as qualifying the
evidence which can be used by agencies in making determinations.
However, subsection 956(1) does not contain the limitation. Further-
more, this is inconsistent with Professor Dakin's observation that the
people who frequently preside over agency proceedings are lay peo-
ple unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.1 ' The implications of this
171. Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
172. 350 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
173. See text at note 168, supra.
174. Dakin, Revised APA, supra note 1, at 810.
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qualification may be significant. In Messer v. Department of Correc-
tions, Louisiana State Penitentiary,"' the court of appeal reversed a
decision of the Civil Service Commission which had sustained the fir-
ing of a person employed at the state penitentiary. Four charges
against the employee were based on an inspection of the prison made
by the Division of Health of the State Department of Health and
Human Resources. A written report of the inspection and findings
were made by the Division of Health. At the hearing the report was
identified by one of the witnesses for the Department of Corrections.
None of the inspe'tors testified.
The court of appeal said: "The report is, therefore, hearsay, and
not competent evidence. Although, under the Administrative Pro-
cedures [sic] Act, the Civil Service Commission is not bound by the
technical rules of evidence, only legally competent evidence will be con-
sidered by us in our review of the case. Since there is no competent
evidence to support these four charges, they are not proven by the
appointing authority."""6 The case relied on by the court in Messer
is Michel v. Department of Public Safety, Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board,'" which also involved an appeal from the Civil Service Com-
mission upholding a dismissal. That case, too, states that "incompe-
tent evidence admitted at the hearing will be disregarded by the Court
in its judicial review."17 Michel, in turn, relies on Hall v. Doyal,79 an
unemployment compensation case, which itself relies on a series of
other unemployment compensation cases. Notably, the statute pro-
viding for judicial review of unemployment compensation ad-
ministi'ative determinations' 8 does not use the term "competent
evidence" as the court implied, but rather utilizes the term "suffi-
cient evidence." The unemployment compensation cases which
engrafted the "competent evidence" test onto the "sufficient evidence"
required by the statute all involved administrative decisions based
on extremely low quality evidence. Probably, the court in each case
would have reversed the administrative decision regardless of whether
it applied the rules of evidence to the record or whether it held the
evidence to a reasonableness standard' 8'
175. 358 So. 2d 975 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
176. Id. at 979 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also Mayerhafer v. Depart-
ment of Police of New Orleans, 235 La. 437, 104 So. 2d 163 (1958).
177. 341 So. 2d 1161 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
178. Id. at 1165.
179. 191 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
180. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
181. Cases often cited for the "competent" evidence standard include: Gardere v.
Brown, 170 So. 2d 758 (La.. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Lee v. Brown, 148 So. 2d 321 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962); Huddleston v. Brown, 124 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960). The
requirement for "competent" evidence in unemployment compensation cases can be
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To fault these unemployment compensation cases is difficult.
However, is it necessarily true that onl legally competent evidence
is probative evidence? Does it make any sense to say that hearsay,
for example, can be admitted in an agency hearing but that the agency
may not rely on it in reaching its decision? Why admit the evidence
in the first place? Why didn't the Louisiana legislature opt for the
standard of admissibility used in judicial proceedings? Probably the
legislature intended to allow agencies to admit and rely on evidence
which was compelling or persuasive regardless of whether it would
have been admissible or relied upon by a court. The test contained
found in Richardson v. Administrator, Division of Employment Security. 28 So. 2d 88
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
The reason for the "competent evidence" rule becomes obvious in reading the cases.
In Gardere v. Brown, supra, an employee had been employed in excess of eight years
and was fired for allegedly disobeying an order. No testimony was given by the per-
son who gave the order or by anyone present when the order was given and allegedly
disobeyed. The only testimony came from the employee's supervisor who recited what
he had been told by the "boss." He had no idea himself of what had occurred. Simi-
larly, in Lee v. Brown, supra, the record included testimony of two witnesses and a
signed document allegedly showing that the employee was drunk. One witness was
an executive of the company who had no personal knowledge of the matter and the
document was a letter sent to the executive by a co-employee. In Huddleston v. Browm,
supra, the office manager testified "without particularization" that there had been
numerous complaints about the employee but there was no evidence in the record
as to any of them. As to this kind of evidence the court of appeal stated:
[O]ur courts are constantly being confronted, in their consideration of claims in-
volving rights to unemployment compensation, by records made up before ad-
ministrative officials and boards of the Department which are replete with what
appears to be the grossest character of hearsay testimony. The instant case pro-
vides a striking illustration. The claimant was not confronted with witnesses who
were responsible for any charges or complaints against him and therefore was
deprived of the opportunity to interrogate such witnesses. It must be pointed
out that continuance of this procedure renders a claimant completely helpless
before mere unsubstantiated representations.
124 So. 2d at 226.
The court of appeal in Lee v. Brown relied on 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public
Welfare S 221, at 318 [now found at S 278, at 568-69 (1977)] for the proposition that
"competent evidence" is the same as "probative evidence." "[IJncompetent or hearsay
evidence are improper and hearsay evidence will not be considered." 148 So. 2d at
324-25. The court concluded that "administrative findings will be set aside on judicial
review, if supported only by hearsay or other normally inadmissible evidence of a
nature that does not afford the claimant a fair opportunity of rebuttal or cross-
examination." Id. at 325.
The court of appeal in King v. Brown, 115 So. 2d 405, 411 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959),
described a most unusual situation in referring to the transcript of the unemployment
hearing: "[A] considerable number of questions were asked by and testimony was given
by, an anonymous person or persons, only designated by the appellation 'background.'
The record does not disclose the interest of this anonymous person or persons, or
that such parties were sworn on the verity of their statements."
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in the LAPA essentially asks whether the evidence which is admit-
ted and relied on by the agency is the kind of evidence in terms of
its source, freshness, clarity, consistency, objectivity, etc., that
reasonable and prudent people would rely on in conducting their af-
fairs. The world does not function according to the rules of evidence.
Courts are authorized to set aside agency decisions only where they
are "[mlanifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence. .".1.
In Fisher v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners," the
court was faced with an administrative record in which hearsay was
admitted by the agency and relied upon. The court was persuaded
by the view of Professor Kenneth C. Davis, who stated that:
[T]he reliability of hearsay ranges from the least to the most
reliable. The reliability of non-hearsay also ranges from the least
to the most reliable. Therefore the guide should be a judgment
about the reliability of particular evidence in a particular cir-
cumstance, not the technical hearsay rule with all its complex
exceptions. ' "
At issue in Fisher was a report made by a D.E.A. agent based upon
information supplied by informants and other law enforcement officers.
The court concluded that the hearsay evidence was reliable and,
therefore, appropriate for the agency's reliance. The case does not
stand broadly for the proposition that an agency may always rely on
hearsay. Instead, under the facts of the case the evidence was reliable.
This approach seems preferable to the automatic reversal of an agency
decision based solely upon hearsay without any consideration as to
the reliability of the evidence and without any concern for fairness
or unfairness to the party. Thus, one may question whether the Messer
case (in which the court of appeal found that the Civil Service Com-
mission erred in upholding a dismissal based upon the report from
the Division of Health) was a correct decision. The Division of Health
makes numerous inspections of public facilities and buildings each year.
Often, it follows up on these inspections by issuing reports. Those
reports are routinely issued and relied- on. The Division of Health is
not part of the Department of Corrections. There is no reason to
suspect collusion between the inspection team and the Corrections
Department.
Furthermore, subsection 956(5) confers upon the agency or subor-
dinate presiding officer a subpoena power. Such power clearly implies
182. LA. R.S. 49:964G(6) (Supp. 1966).
183. 352 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
184. Id. at 731 (citing Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 689 (1964)).
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that a party who tenders fees and expenses has the right to request
that witnesses be subpoened. Arguably by offering the Division of
Health report, the agency made a prima facie case. If the accuracy
of that report was a central issue, the agency on its own motion or
the party adversely affected upon request could have invoked the sub-
poena power. In this way the party would not be deprived unfairly
of cross-examination.
The legislature has spoken in clear terms, but some courts have
restricted the broad criteria of admissibility and reliance. Some addi-
tion to the statute might be desirable to the effect that "agency find-
ings of fact shall not be set aside solely because they are based on
evidence which would not be admissible in a court of law.1 85
The remainder of section 956 is rather straightforward. Subsec-
tion (2) requires that documentary evidence on which the agency relies
should be offered and made part of the record. Documents may be
received in the form of copies, excerpts, or incorporation by reference.
Where incorporation is by reference the parties must be given access
to the materials before they are received in evidence.
Subsection (3) authorizes the use of judicial notice and notice of
"generally recognized technical and scientific facts within the agency's
specialized knowledge." However, the party affected must be apprised
of the material noted "including any staff memoranda or data . .. .
Subsection (4) gives the presiding officer routine powers necessary
to schedule and conduct a hearing and subsection (5) gives to the
agency or presiding officer the power to issue subpoenas. Disobedience
of a subpoena is punishable in a court as a contempt.
Subsections (6) and (7) relate to discovery. Subsection (6) authorizes
the agency, presiding officer or a party to take depositions as pro-
vided in civil cases. Depositions so taken may be offered in evidence
subject to the evidentiary rules of the LAPA. Subsection (7) allows
each agency, itself, to formulate rules of discovery. On the matter
of discovery, the court of appeal in Tassistro v. Louisiana State Rac-
ing Commission,"' disapproved when the Racing Commission did not
give the owner of a horse suspected of being drugged an opportunity
to have his own test made before destroying the specimen after a
positive finding had been made.
Subsection (8) was added by amendment in 1976.187 This provision
deals with confidential or privileged records and documents, and pro-
185. This clause could be added at the conclusion of subsection 964G(6).
186. 269 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
187. LA. R.S. 49:956, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 524, S I.
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hibits agencies from disclosing such documents in adjudication pro-
ceedings or releasing them through subpoena. These documents and
records are limited to "private contracts, geological and geophysical
information and data, trade secrets or commercial and financial
data . . . ." Protection is offered only when the documents were ob-
tained by the agency through "voluntary agreement" and the
documents were designated as "confidential and privileged" when
turned over to the agency.
Agencies often act through hearing officers or by otherwise
delegating authority to someone other than the full body to preside
over a hearing. When the agency has not heard the case or read the
record, but is relying on the conclusion of someone else, the parties
must see the proposed order and a statement of reasons, as well as
the disposition of factual and legal issues, before the agency issues
a final order."u
4. Miscellaneous Matters
Final orders and decisions must be in writing or stated in the
record. They must contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
rulings on proposed findings of fact submitted by a party. Parties
shall be notified of the order personally or by mail.18'
Section 959 provides that decisions and orders shall be subject
to rehearing within ten days from the entry of the decision or order.
A rehearing may be granted when the decision is contrary to law
or the evidence, newly discovered evidence exists, important issues
were not considered, or some other good ground exists which is in
the public interest. The rehearing provision as written does not
restrict its applicability to a losing or aggrieved party. In Tassistro
v. Louisiana Racing Commission,'" the court of appeal held that the
Commission on its ovn motion may reopen a matter. The basis in
the statute for a rehearing when there is "other good ground" which
advances the public interest should be liberally construed."'
Separation of functions is provided in section 960. A member or
employee of an agency assigned the responsibility for making a deci-
sion or finding "in a case of adjudication noticed and docketed for
hearing shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection
with any issue of fact or law" with (1) a party or his representative,
or (2) a person engaged in the investigative, prosecutive or advocacy
188. LA. R.S. 49:957 (Supp. 1966).
189. Id. S 958.
190. 269 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
191. Id. at 837.
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functions unless notice is given to all parties and they have an oppor-
tunity also to participate. In one unemployment compensation case,
the court of appeal stated that private talks between the referee and
counsel for the employer are prohibited. However, if the communica-
tion did occur, the agency's decision will not be set aside if the record
reveals that the proceedings were conducted fairly and that there are
no allegations of fraud or undue influence.'92
The rules for adjudication are clear and uncomplicated, and have
generated little in the way of case law. This lack of litigation indicates
either a high rate of agency compliance, or a failure of parties to in-
sist that the rules be followed. Perhaps it reveals a lack of familiari-
ty with the rules. In any event, the rules which govern formal agen-
cy adjudication are adequate.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The "Right" to Judicial Review
The right to judicial review is well established in Louisiana and
is an integral part of administrative procedure. Review is an impor-
tant safeguard of due process and the availability of judicial review
may be critical in determining whether a party has been denied due
process."3
The Louisiana Supreme Court has indicated that the right to
judicial review of agency action is a constitutional right apart from
any statute which explicitly grants a right of review. 9 " "Generally
the availability of judicial review is necessary to the validity of such
[administrative] proceedings under our legal system and traditions."'
The court pointed to actions by the United States Supreme Court
which, in effect, create "a presumption of reviewability which yields
only to affirmative legislative intent in favor of unreviewability when
such intent is based upon reasonable grounds or to special reason for
unreviewability because of the peculiar subject matter or
circumstances."'"
In addition to the due process rationale, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has relied on article I, section 6 of the 1921 Constitution (arti-
cle I, section 22 of the 1974 Constitution) which provides that "all
Courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy
192. Dorsey v. Administrator, La. Dep't of Employment Security, 353 So. 2d 363
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
193. Parker v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 84 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
194. Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971).
195. 259 La. at 843-44, 253 So. 2d at 203.
196. Id.
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by due process of law" as mandating judicial review.'" Even where
a statute provides that the decision of a board "shall be final" the
courts have found a right to judicial review.'
In Werner v. Board of Trustees of New Orleans Police Pension
Fund,'" the statute provided that the decisions of the board "shall
be final and conclusive. There shall be no appeal from the finding
of the board."2" The court of appeal found that the prohibition of
review fell short of the requirements of due process, and applied
subsection 964A of the LAPA to provide such review. "'We have held
that although administrative bodies have power to determine as
original proposition the matters assigned to them under statute, a
party whose legal rights have been adversely affected by that deter-
mination may test its legal correctness in the courts'."' However,
in some instances the court has accepted the legislative determina-
tion that agency action shall be final, such as in the denial of parole."
Under article V, section 16 of the Constitution of 1974, district
courts have original jurisdiction as provided therein, and appellate
jurisdiction as provided by law. The constitution contains no barrier
to providing judicial review whether designated as an appeal or not. 3
However, under the 1921 Constitution judicial review in district courts
presented a problem. The 192i Constitution specified the cases in
which the district courts could exercise appellate jurisdiction. In Bowen
v. Doyal"4 the plaintiff brought an action in the district court to review
a decision by the Board of Review of the Division of Employment
Security which had upheld a referee's decision that he was not
qualified for unemployment compensation benefits. His action was
based on a statute which provided for judicial review.2 ' The district
court held that the statute providing for judicial review in the district
court was unconstitutional since it authorized the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by a district court in a case.not provided for in the Con-
stitution of 1921. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.
After establishing the "constitutional" right to judicial review the
court concluded that judicial review of agency action was not an "ap-
197. 259 La. at 847-50, 253 So. 2d at 203-04.
198. Anderson v. State, 363 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
199. 360 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
200. LA. R.S. 33:2284 (1950 & Supp. 1972).
201. 360 So. 2d at 616 (citing Bowen v. Doyal, 253 So. 2d at 203-04).
202. Smith v. Dunn, 263 La. 599, 268 So. 2d 670 (1972); LA. R.S. 15:574.11 (Supp.
1968).
203. Touchette v. City of Rayne, Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 321 So. 2d
62 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
204. 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971).
205. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
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peal" and hence not an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Such review
was instead an exercise of original jurisdiction. Some authority sup-
ports this view. However, in defining terms such as "original jurisdic-
tion," "appellate jurisdiction" and "appeals," one must carefully
evaluate the context in which a term is used."7 At issue in the Bowen
case was whether the legislature constitutionally could vest the district
courts with power to review decisions of the Board of Review. The
supreme court said that the jurisdictional provisions of article VII
of the Constitution of 1921 were intended to allocate jurisdiction in
terms of the relationships among the courts. Hence, matters originate
in district courts subject to appellate review in the courts of appeal
and the supreme court. The term "appeal" and "appellate" were used
only to define the relationship among the courts and not the relation-
ship between the courts and administrative tribunals. In this sense
one cannot take an "appeal" from administrative action because the
terms "appeal" and "appellate jurisdiction" describe the process
whereby a higher court reviews the decision of a lower court. The
district court had original jurisdiction because in the context of the
case "original" meant the first judicial examination of the issues.
The terms "appeal," "appellate jurisdiction" and "original jurisdic-
tion" have other meanings as well. For example, when a court exer-
cises its original jurisdiction we often think of the matter beginning
in that court. The court of original jurisdiction receives the evidence;
it hears testimony under legal rules. However, a district court con-
ducts judicial review of agency action on the record. Evidence will
not ordinarily be received. 8 Functionally,. the district court performs
like an appellate court rather than a trial court. Thus, the terms "ap-
peal," "original" and "appellate jurisdiction" may mean different things
depending on how they are used.
The court's determination in Bowen that the legislature could con..
stitutionally confer on district courts the power to review agency ac..
tion merely means that there was an oversight in the constitution
by not generally or specifically defining judicial jurisdiction in rela.
tionship to administrative action. Nothing in the constitution denies
courts this function. In fact, Louisiana decisions had stated that there
was a constitutional right to such review. In such instances, there
is no reason why courts should not defer to legislative judgments
206. See, e.g., Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 26 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind. 1940); Nevada
Tax Comm'r v. Mackie, 74 Nev. 276, 329 P.2d 448, 449 (1958); Southern Ry. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 195 S.C. 247, 10 S.E.2d 769, 772 11940).
207. "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'" L. CARROLL. THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 117 (Harper ed. 1902).
208. LA. R.S. 49:964F (Supp. 1966).
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which implement the constitutional right to judicial review. However,
the decision should not be read as holding that judicial review can
be vested only in the district courts. Should the legislature seek to
vest judicial review of agency action in the courts of appeal or the
supreme court, one could argue logically that judicial review is func-
tionally analogous to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and satisfies
the requirements of the constitution.
The right to judicial review is considered so important that the
Louisiana courts have said that agencies may not penalize people who
exercise their right to review. In the case of In re Coppola," the Loui-
siana Commission on Governmental Ethics suspended petitioner for
thirty days. Because of errors at the hearing stage the court of ap-
peal remanded the case for rehearing.21 Upon rehearing, the charges
were again sustained and the petitioner was demoted from captain
to lieutenant. The court, drawing an analogy to criminal procedure,
set aside the demotion and ordered the original thirty-day suspen-
sion reinstated.21'
B. Administrative Actions Subject to Review
1. Judicial Review of Declaratory Orders
Three sections of the LAPA relate to judicial review. These deal
with review of declaratory orders,"'2 agency rules, 3 and decisions
based on adjudication."' Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:962 requires
that agencies adopt procedures for entertaining and disposing of re-
quests for declaratory rulings which may be submitted to them.
Declaratory orders and rulings are treated as decisions or orders in
adjudicated cases for purposes of judicial review."'
2. Judicial Review of Agency Rules
Judicial review also is permitted to contest the "validity" or "ap-
plicability" of a rule.2" Such action must be filed in the district court
of the parish where the agency is located. A court may invalidate
a rule and declare it inapplicable only "if it finds that it violates con-
stitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency
209. 270 So. 2d 190 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted, 272 So. 2d 372 (La. 1973).
210. 222 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969): 256 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
211. 270 So. 2d at 193.
212. LA. R.S. 49:962 (Supp. 1966).
213. Id. S 963.
214. Id. S 964.
215. See LA. R.S. 49:962 and the discussion of that section at note 223, infra, and ac-
companying text.
216. LA. R.S. 49:963 (Supp. 1966).
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or was adopted without substantial compliance with required rule-
making procedures." 1 ' The agency must be made a party to the ac-
tion. The section imposes a strict requirement of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. As a prerequisite to judicial review the plain-
tiff must first ask the agency to review the validity or applicability
of the rule. Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that seeking review
of the validity or applicability of the rule through an agency decision
in a contested adjudicated case "would not provide an adequate
remedy and would inflict irreparable injury""8 before the procedure
can be bypassed.
Section 963, in contrast to section 964 which deals with adjudica-
tion, is silent on the standards to be used by the courts in reviewing
agency rules. The stated grounds for review, however, make prescrib-
ing any standards unnecessary. The grounds deal only with constitu-
tionality, scope of statutes, or failure to follow rule-making procedures.
Essentially these are matters of law and within the competence of
the court. They are not ordinarily matters on which a court needs
guidance. A question arises, however, if the applicability or validity
of a rule is questioned by challenging an agency's application of the
rule to a particular set of facts. In other words, an agency has made
a decision in which it has applied the rule in question and a party
who was affected adversely seeks judicial review of that decision and
the rule on which it is based. What standard should the court use? 1
A direct attack on the validity of a rule was made in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission." The
supreme court said that agency rules
are entitled to great weight and are not to be overturned on
judicial review, unless shown to be arbitrary, or capricious, or
abusive of the commission's authority. . . .[A] person attacking
a commission order bears the burden of demonstrating that it is
defective, since the order is presumed to be valid. . .. [W]hile
a ruling of the commission may be deemed arbitrary unless sup-
ported by some factual evidence, the function of the court on
judicial review is not to re-weigh and re-evaluate the evidence
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. In White v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 385 So. 2d 400, 401-02
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), the Civil Service Commission granted a summary disposition
on an appeal which was not filed within the time set out in the rules. The court of
appeal said that those "(riules have the force of law, and the Courts of this State
will not pass upon the wisdom or policy of the Rules." Of course, the White case
presented no direct challenge to the rule.
220. 343 So. 2d 1040 (La. 1977).
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and to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency."
The same approach was used in National Dairy Products Corp. v. Loui.
siana Milk Commission.' In that case the court expressly referred
to and used the LAPA standards for review of adjudications.M
In Cannatella v. City Civil Service Commission,"' the plaintiff, a
police officer, challenged as unreasonable the rules of the New Orleans
Civil Service Commission which failed to give credit for time served
as a police cadet. The court of appeal stated that
[tihe general rule is that the reasonable discretion of administrative
boards will not be set aside in the absence of proof of an abuse
of discretion .... The Courts should not interfere with the bona
fide judgment of such a board based upon substantial evidence.
* . . The decision cannot be considered arbitrary unless the set-
ting was made without reasons or reference tb relevant considera-
tions. Arbitrariness is the absence of a rational basis.22
The court reversed the trial judge who did not apply these standards
but instead "substituted his opinion for that of the Civil Service Com-
mission and its Director."' One judge concurred and found that the
rules could not be characterized as "unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious.22
Thus, the courts apparently are using the standard for evaluating
agency conclusions which is contained in section 964G(5). That subsec-
tion on judicial review of adjudications allows a court to reverse or
modify an agency decision which is "arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abus, of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise
of discretion .
Ordinarily a party who contests the validity or applicability of
administrative rules must, under the LAPA, raise the issue in an ad-
ministrative proceeding before seeking judicial review. However,
where
the issues relate more to the lawfulness of the rule-making order
rather than to the factual basis or the administrative policies which
support its validity- instances in which administrative expertise
should be permitted to explain the technical bases for the rule
221. Id. at 1044 (citations omitted).
222. 236 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
223. LA. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 1966).
224. 381 So. 2d 1278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
225. Id. at 1280 (citations omitted).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1281.
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in an administrative record-many state courts do not mandatorily
require prior resort to an administrative remedy."
3. Judicial Review of Agency Adjudication
Agency adjudication is subject to judicial review under section
964 of the LAPA. Typically, it provides that "[a) person who is ag-
grieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is
entitled to judicial review." The provision for judicial review in the
LAPA does not preclude or limit other judicial remedies provided
by law. Generally, only final agency action is subject to judicial review.
However, non-final agency action may be reviewed if review of the
final agency action "would not provide an adequate remedy and would
inflict irreparable harm."
The district courts have jurisdiction to review agency decisions,
and venue is in the parish where the agency is "located." The peti-
tion for review must be filed "within thirty days after mailing of notice
of the final decision by the agency or if a rehearing is requested within
thirty days after the decision thereon." The agency and parties of
record must be served with copies of the petition.
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:964 does not require a party to seek
a rehearing. In contrast to section 963, which deals with judicial review
of rule-making, section 964 does not explicitly require exhaustion of
administrative remedies; it does, however, provide for review of "final
decisions or orders." Yet the cases uniformly approve of exhaustion
of remedies. The issue was discussed in Bonomo v. Louisiana Downs,
Inc. m The court quoted with approval from McKart v. United States,
where the United States Supreme Court said:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well
established in the jurisprudence of administrative law .... The
doctrine provides "that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
remedy has been exhausted." ''
The court of appeal, relying on Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc.
v. Coleman,"z stated that the rule may be subject to some exceptions,
228. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 343 So. 2d 1040,
1042 n.1 (La. 1977).
229. 337 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
230. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
231. 337 So. 2d at 560 (citing 395 U.S. at 193 (citation omitted)).
232. 515 F.2d 860, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1975).
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and referred to some of the factors courts consider in determining
whether to require exhaustion of remedies. These considerations in-
clude the harshness of the penalty a plaintiff suffers if he cannot assert
his claim in court. Where a penalty is not unduly harsh, courts are
unlikely to find an exception to the exhaustion requirement if cir-
cumvention of agency procedure will seriously impair the ability of
the agency to perform its functions or if the issue on which the deci-
sion rests is one which involves agency expertise, or the missing ad-
ministrative decision would facilitate judicial review. Other factors con-
sidered by courts include whether other plaintiffs are likely to bypass
the agency and burden the courts, and whether the matter involves
an area where the agency has been given substantial autonomy."
Romero v. Stephens,28 raised the issue of whether exhaustion was
required when the relevant statute and agency rule provide that a
person "may" appeal a decision of the stewards to the Racing Com-
mission. The court interpreted the word "may" as meaning "must."
In so doing the court observed that to allow a direct attack in court
of the stewards' decision would circumvent the special burden of proof
provisions-that is, the standard used in judicial review and the ex-
tent of review provided section 964 for the review of agency deci-
sions. The Louisiana courts have gone far in interpreting statutes to
provide for an administrative hearing, even when the statutes do not
so expressly provide, and to then invoke the exhaustion principle."'
Failure to exercise one's right to administrative review may preclude
judicial review.'
b. Jurisdiction and Venue
Jurisdiction to review agency decision is in the district courts,
unless there are provisions to the contrary. For example, appeals from
the Civil Service Commission are to the courts of appeal;"' appeals
from the State Ethics Board are to the Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit.' The appropriate district court is the one which sits in the
parish where the agency is "located," as held in Evers v. Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners.m The "location" of an agency is
its domicile and not in any parish where the agency has an office.,"
233. 337 So. 2d at 560-61.
234. 359 So. 2d 1061 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
235. See Steeg v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 329 So. 2d 719 (La. 1976).
236. Brown v. Phelps, 374 So. 2d 664 (La. 1979); Armistead v. Phelps, 365 So. 2d
468 (La. 1978); Davis v. Hudson, 374 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). See also Anderson
v. State, 363 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
237. LA. CONST. art. X, S 12.
238. LA. R.S. 42:1142(A) (Supp. 1979).
239. 336 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
240. Brown v. Phelps, 392 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
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Once suit is filed in the proper court, that court may exercise
ancillary jurisdiction in aid of its original jurisdiction. The Evers case
presented an interesting problem in which plaintiff sought judicial
review in the proper district court of an agency decision which denied
his application for a permanent license to practice medicine. The Board
was located in New Orleans and suit was filed in the Orleans Parish
Civil District Court. The Board filed a "reconventional demand" for
a temporary restraining order to prevent plaintiff from practicing
medicine pending the appeal. Plaintiff was a resident and domiciliary
of Plaquemines Parish and usually actions seeking injunctions must
be brought in the domicile of the party to be enjoined. On rehearing,
the court of appeal held first that under subsection 961B of the LAPA,
the court upon review had the power to decide whether the temporary
license should remain in effect pending appeal. That issue was raised
by the demand for the temporary restraining order. Although filing
of the "reconventional demand" would not be appropriate in the ap-
peal of a case, the court pointed out that judicial review in the district
court is an exercise of "original jurisdiction" and not an appeal. Finally,
the court held that the Orleans Parish Court had jurisdiction to issue
the injunction pendente lite under the theory of ancillary jurisdiction.
In such matters the ordinary rule of venue does not apply.
c. .Time Limits
The Act provides that petitions for review must be filed within
thirty days after the agency has mailed its final decision or "if a
rehearing is requested, within thirty days after the decision thereon." '
Some statutes have specific provisions which alter some of the
particulars relating to review. For example, the statute in Hills v.
Boninm provided that review from adjudications of the LHSRSA, Divi-
sion of Family Services, Should be sought within fifteen days and
should be filed in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. The court
held that the time limits were to be strictly adhered to in this case. 3
In another example, the applicable statute gave plaintiff thirty days
to seek judicial review of the suspension of his driver's license. Plain-
tiff filed his petition thirty-six days after the agency action and upon
241. LA. R.S. 49:964(B) (Supp. 1976 & 1981).
242. 329 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
243. d. Interestingly, in Hills and the case on which it relies, David v. Department
of Public Safety, 261 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), review of agency action by
the district court was denominated an "appeal." "It is the settled jurisprudence of
this state that the time for taking an appeal and furnishing security therefore ...
are jurisdictional issues which cannot be waived. . .. An appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction of an appeal which is not taken and perfected by the timely filing
of the bond within the prescribed statutory time." 261 So. 2d at 349.
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appeal from the decision of the district court, his petition was dis-
missed by the court of appeal on its own motion."
The filing of the petition does not result in an automatic stay,
but both the agency and the reviewing court have the power to grant
a stay. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the time provision
seems rather clear. Where no rehearing is requested, a party has
thirty days from mailing. At least one court of appeal has construed
a similar provision to allow a period of forty days. Quinn v. Depart-
ment of Health"4 5 involved review of a Civil Service Commission deci-
sion. The constitution provides that review of the Commission's deci-
sion may be obtained within thirty days after its decision becomes
final. The Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, Rule 16, section
1, defines "final decision" as the date on which the Commission files
its written decision "if no timely application is made for a rehear-
ing .... ." When rehearing is requested, the decision is final when the
Commission acts on the rehearing. Since the LAPA allows ten days
to file for a rehearing, one cannot know whether a party will request
a rehearing unless the party actually files within the period or the
ten days elapse without such a petition having been filed. The Quinn
court thought that the Commission decision could not be considered
final until the ten days had elapsed in cases where the party does
not petition for rehearing. Thus, the thirty days runs from the ex-
piration of the ten day rehearing time frame, and parties who do not
file petitions get forty days rather than thirty days. The constitution
and court rules are clear, and it is difficult to understand how a sim-
ple thirty-day time period became muddled into a forty-day period." '4
The language of the LAPA on time limits, though not identical to
the provisions involved in Quinn, is subject to the same possible
distortion.
d. Review Procedures
The Act provides that review is to be carried out by the court
without a jury and is to be a review on the record. Subsection 964F
provides that in cases of "irregularities in procedure before the
agency" which do not appear on the record, the court may allow proof
to be offered in court. Also, before the judicial hearing the court may
order additional evidence to be taken before the agency if the court
is so requested and the evidence is shown to be material and "good
reasons" prevented introducing it at the proceeding before the agency.
244. Id.
245. 347 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
246. See also Paulin v. Department of Sanitation, 383 So. 2d 1064 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1980).
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In such cases the agency may modify its findings and decision based
on the new evidence.
After a petition for review has been served on the agency, the
agency has at least thirty days to send to the court the original or
a certified copy of the entire record of the proceedings. The court
shall allow oral argument if requested and accept written briefs.
Review under the LAPA is not by way of a de novo proceeding
but review on the record. Despite the characterization of judicial
review in its first instance as an exercise of "original jurisdiction,"
there is no question that the courts in conducting the "review" use
appellate rules and procedures. The appellate nature of the review
is reflected in numerous statements by courts of the importance of
the record, the necessity for agencies to make findings, etc. The Loui
siana Supreme Court, in Baton Rouge Water Works v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission,""7 stated:
For purposes of judicial review and in order to assure that
the Commission has acted in accordance with law, it is usually
preferable that, in a contested case involving complex issues, the
administrative agency makes findings as to the central disputed
issues and explain the reasons for its determination . ..
Louisiana courts have on occasion remanded for this purpose
when unable to review the agency determination in the absence
thereof."8
The court in White v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 9 held
it improper for the district court to receive in evidence depositions
of a number of witnesses which had never been submitted to the Com-
mission. In reviewing agency decisions courts ordinarily admit addi-
tional evidence only in exceptional cases. Furthermore, neither trial
nor appellate courts are allowed to make independent findings of fact
when findings are in the administrative record unless those findings
are arbitrary or not, based on substantial evidence.'
These comments highlight the need for a complete record of the'
evidence before the agency and for the agency to supply the court
with findings. In White the court remarked, in a critical manner, at
the "confusion in the transcript," "meager evidence" and that the
"Commission has failed to make a finding of fact in these cases." The
247. 342 So. 2d 609 (La. 1977).
248. Id. at 612 (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Sutton, 356 So. 2d 965, 974
(La. 1978).
249. 259 La. 363. 250 So. 2d 368 (1971).
250. 259 La. at 374-75, 250 So. 2d at 372.
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relationship between agency findings, the basis therefor,, and judicial
review was explained:
The reviewing courts, which are not endowed with the ad-
ministrative body's special knowledge apparently carried over from
one case to another in many administrative proceedings, must have
the evidence which supports that knowledge made part of the
record."'
While the LAPA provides for review on the record, the adjudica-
tion rules do not apply to all agency decisions. Generally, however,
where the agency conducts a hearing and amasses a record, judicial
review should be on the record and not de novo. Occasionally, courts
have lost sight of this basic tenet of judicial review. In Jaubert v.
Department of Public Safety,'" the court of appeal held that judicial
review of driver's license suspensions should take the form of a de
novo proceeding. Incredibly, the court relied on section 964 of the
LAPA to support the conclusion that "[t]he court is not restricted
to a review of the findings of the Department." ' The LAPA is pre-
cisely to the contrary. The Act recognizes de novo review only when
provided by some law which gives an additional remedy. The license
revocation laws do not provide for de novo review. As one of the
dissenting judges pointed out, the majority failed to appreciate a basic
distinction in the procedures followed under the two statutes which
provide for revocation. Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:414, a
license may be revoked upon investigation. The statute contains no
provision for an administrative hearing. Thus, the first and only hear-
ing is in the district court when the petitioner seeks judicial review.
The proceeding in the district court is not as though it were a new
proceeding, it is the only proceeding. The other statute which pro-
vides for suspension is Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:668. This was
the statute involved in Jaubert, and it provides a driver with a right
to an administrative hearing. Nothing in this statute says that judicial
review after the administrative hearing should be by trial de novo.
There is no need for a trial de novo, and the decision is contrary to
the usual rules of judicial review.
That district courts exercising judicial review under LAPA sec-
tion 964 are not to use the trial de novo is stated in unequivocal
language in Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension.1u The case
251. 259 La. at 378 n.3, 250 So. 2d at 373 n.3.
252. 259 La. at 374, 250 So. 2d at 372.
253. 323 So. 2d 212 (La. App.. 4th Cir. 1975).
254. Id. at 214.
255. 367 So. 2d 849 (La. 1979).
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was tried by the district court as a de novo matter. The court of ap-
peal said that in this case the trial court could have remanded the
matter to the board which had failed to present it with a proper record
and findings. The court considered remanding the case to the board,
but in the interest of "judicial economy" resolved the case on the trial
record.l The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the agency erred
in not following the procedures of the LAPA, the trial judge erred
in conducting judicial review in the form of trial de novo, and the
court of appeal erred in resolving the matter on the trial court
record."'7
e. Standards for Review of Agency Adjudication
Subsection 964G of the LAPA defines the scope and standards
for judicial review of agency decisions as follows:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of dis-
cretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(6) Manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record. In the ap.-
plication of the rule, where the agency has the oppor..
tunity to judge of the credibility of witnesses by first.
256. Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension, 360 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1978).
257. The court stated:
These provisions defining the nature and scope of judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act do not authorize a trial de novo in the reviewing
court. To the contrary, it is clear that the review "shall be confined to the record"
as established before the agency. If the reviewing court were allowed to hear
such matters de novo and substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency, it would be usurping the power delegated by the legislature to the ad-
ministrative agency. [The Act] ... permits the administrative agency to weigh
and evaluate the evidence with proper respect being given to its expertise in
the matter. Additionally it promotes the uniform application of the statute under
which the agency operates.
367 So. 2d at 853.
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hand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and
the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given
to the agency's determination of credibility issues.
The first four grounds which justify judicial reversal or modifica-
tion of an agency's decision involve evaluations of agency actions in
light of established legal standards-e.g., does the agency action violate
the constitution; does the agency action violate a statute; has the agen-
cy gone beyond the authority delegated to it by statute; was the agen-
cy action based upon some error of law? These grounds raise tradi-
tional legal issues.
Several examples of these "legal" errors follow. An agency deci-
sion will be set aside if it violates the "fair notice" requirement.
Agency action based on charges not contained in the notice cannot
be sustained.'"
In City of Kenner v. Wool," 9 the court of appeal considered action
by the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Commission of the City
of Kenner which had set aside a demotion and increased a suspension
order issued by the chief of police. The court of appeal held that the
action of the Commission went beyond the statutory authority which
limited its scope of review to a determination of whether the action
of the appointing authority was "'in good faith for cause.'" The Com-
mission was not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the
appointing authority. An agency decision will be reversed where the
agency failed to afford the parties a hearing to which they are
entitled. "
Where the legislature has imposed certain prerequisites to agency
action, e.g., finding of jurisdictional facts, the agency must comply with
those prerequisites for its action to be valid."1 Furthermore, an agency
action will not be sustained merely because it is generally "in the
public interest," if its authority to act is prescribed by the legislature
to specific occasions. In Hunter v. Hussey,' the agency issued an order
based on a finding that it would permit "a more efficient operation"
and would "prevent waste. ' " The court found this to be error since
the order in part went beyond the scope of the agency's authority.26
258. Calhoun v. Administrator of Dept. of Employment Security, 390 So. 2d 912
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
259. 320 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
260. See generally White v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 259 La. 363, 250 So. 2d
368 (1971).
261. Brown v. Sutton, 356 So. 2d 965 (La. 1978).
262. 90 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
263. Id. at 437.
264. The agency was authorized by statute to issue an order like the one in ques-
tion only "to minimize drainage 'which is not equalized by counter drainage' and must
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The use by an agency of improper procedures may constitute a
legal error which requires setting aside its decision. The court of ap-
peal in In re Coppola"' set aside a Commission order and remanded
the matter for rehearing because the Commission's order was based
in part on facts adduced at a private hearing at which plaintiff and
counsel were excluded and were obviously unable to cross-examine
witnesses. This was a violation of statute as well as a denial of due
process. The case was remanded also because the Commission in
suspending plaintiff acted in a manner not authorized by statute.
While judicial review is available to vindicate claims of denial of
due process, some courts have held that an agency which makes a
decision need not personally hear the witnesses; that responsibility
can be delegated to a hearing examiner. Furthermore, it is not essen-
tial to the legality of the proceedings for the hearing officer to make
recommended findings. In case of discharge of employees, due pro-
cess is satisfied if the parties have an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to present their cases."'
Less clear-cut are the provisions in subsections 964G(5) and (6)
which authorize reversal or modification when agency findings or deci-
sions are "arbitrary," and "capricious," "characterized by an abuse
of discretion" .or are "manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." In Baton Rouge
Water Works v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,"'7 the court ar-
ticulated the scope of judical review:
The general principal governing judicial review is that, where
some evidence as reasonably interpreted supports the regulatory
body's determination, the orders of the Commission and other
regulatory bodies exercising discretionary authority are accorded
great weight and will not be overturned by the courts in the
absence of a clear showing that the administrative action is ar-
bitrary and capricious.
The Courts may not on judicial review substitute their judg-
ment for the Commission's and overturn an administrative deter-
deprive no producer for his just and equitable share." Id. (citing LA. R.S. 33:11 (1950)).
Accord, Benson & Gold Chev. v. La. Motor Veh. Comm'n, 403 So. 2d 13 (La. 1981),
"Although a regulatory agency is entitled to a certain amount of hegemony over the
statutes it is entrusted to administer, it cannot go too far afield from the letter of
the law even if it perceives that it is furthering the law's spirit." Id., at 20.
265. 222 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
266. Hamilton v. Louisiana Health & Human Resources Administration, 341 So.
2d 1190 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
267. 342 So. 2d 609 (La. 1977).
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mination not shown to be clearly arbitrary as contrary to law or
to the evidence heard by the regulatory body.268
Arbitrariness has been characterized as an "absence of a rational
basis.""26 In Graffeo v. City of New Orleans the court of appeal ob-
served that "[w~hile 'arbitrary' is defined either as based on individual
judgment or discretion or as determined by whim or caprice, only
the latter is prohibited in the exercise of administrative func-
tions ... ." ' Where an agency decision is not required to be made
pursuant to the LAPA rules on adjudication, the LAPA rules on
judicial review do not apply. However, judicial review will still be
available to correct a decision which is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, or which amounts to an abuse of discretion or power."
To make a valid claim for judicial review the petition must allege
facts which would lead a court to conclude that the agency abused
its discretion. Allegations which are nothing more than bare
statements and conclusions of law, e.g., "the decision was arbitrary
or capricious," are insufficient to state a cause of action."' After an
agency hearing in which evidence on the issues has been introduced
in compliance with the rules of procedure, the agency action is pre-
sumed valid and its findings must be given great weight by the court
of review."' In addition to examining whether the decision was ar-
bitrary or an abuse of discretion, a court will also include within the
scope of review the issues of whether the agency acted as provided
for by the relevant statutes and whether its decision is supported
by substantial evidence.
Subsections 964G(5) and (6), while they appear to be similar, are
not intended to be applied to the same considerations. Sometimes
courts confuse the two standards, such as when one court said that
whether the agency committed "manifest error" depends on whether
the agency acted "arbitrarily" or "capriciously. " ' The manifest error
test is used in reviewing the facts as found by the agency. The ar-
bitrariness test is used in reviewing conclusions and exercises of
268. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted). See also Chism v. City of Baton Rouge, 224
So. 2d 48 (La. App. lt Cir. 1971).
269. Graffeo v. City of New Orleans, 351 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
270. Id. at 1314 n.4. See also Cannatella v. City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 381 So. 2d
1278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
271. See Hagood v. Pickering, 385 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
272. Id.
273. Tassistro v. Louisiana St. Racing Comm'n, 269 So. 2d 834, 839 n.12 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1972); First Nat'l Bank of Abbeville v. Sehrt, 246 So. 2d 382, 385 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1971).
274. ' Gertler v. City of New Orleans, 346 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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agency discretion. Where there are no factual issues the manifest er-
ror test is not used.2 75
Manifest error can be found only if upon examination of the whole
record no reliable, probative and substantial evidence supports the
facts as found by the agency. The subsection is silent on whether
the evidence must be "competent" and whether hearsay may be relied
on.' The admission of evidence which would not be admissible in court
does not invalidate agency proceedings. The strict rules of evidence
do not apply. But some courts will uphold agency action only if sup-
ported by substantial, competent evidence. Of course, even though
the manifest error test is very favorable to agency fact finding, the
record must still contain some reliable, probative and substantial
evidence to support its findings and conclusions."7 An agency deter-
mination which has no evidentiary support is arbitrary. s
Subsection 964G(6) represents a blending of the standard for suf-
ficiency of facts contained in the Model State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, section 15(g)(5), and the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, section 10(e), 5 U.S.C. S 706(E). The Model Act uses a "clearly
erroneous" test for review of facts, while the Federal APA uses a
"substantial evidence" test."'
This blending of the "clearly ["manifestly" in the LAPAJ er-
roneous" and "substantial evidence" tests raises some question as to
what standard is set by subsection 964G(6). The matter does not seem
to have engendered much discussion either in the jurisprudence or
law review literature. Perhaps if the "manifestly erroneous" standard
275. Insurance Serv. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 iLa. App. 1st
Cir. 1979); Statesman Nat'l Life v. American Allied Life Ins., 366 So. 2d 940 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978).
276. See discussions of Messer and Mihel, supra notes 17582, and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Louisiana St. Racing Comm'n, 228 So. 2d 653 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
278. Id. at 657. See Adams, State Administrative Procedure: The Role of Interven-
tion and Discovery in Adjudicatory Hearings, 74 Nw. L. REV. 854, 872, 885 (1980).
279. Professor Dakin, who opted for the "substantial evidence" test, observed this
difference between the two:
"Clearly erroneous" may thus mean no more than that of two conflicting findings
of ultimate fact, each supported by persuasive evidence the reviewing court con-
cludes that the finding not made by the trial court is more persuasive.
... [Ulnder the substantial evidence rule, the reviewing court, must, as a prac-
tical necessity, reweigh the evidence to determine whether or not the evidence
has sufficient weight to compel reasonable men to reach the same conclusion as
the agency, or sufficient weight for reasonable men to differ among themselves
in the conclusion. But once the court decides that the evidence has sufficient weight
to meet either of these conditions, the court, under the substantial evidence rule.
may weigh no further.
Dakin, Revised APA, supra note 1, at 820-22.
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is broader than the "substantial evidence" test, in the sense that it
allows a reviewing court more leeway in overturning agency action,
then the scope of that test may have been qualified by the Act. The
LAPA states that a finding of "manifestly erroneous" can be made
only "in view of the . . . substantial evidence on the whole record."
If substantial evidence supports two conflicting sets of ultimate facts,
perhaps a court could not characterize an agency's findings as "mani-
festly erroneous." On the other hand, subsection 964G(6) may mean
nothing more than that a trial judge's determination of manifest er-
ror should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence in
the record, notwithstanding that "substantial evidence" to the con-
trary may also be present.
As part of the manifest error standard, reviewing courts are ad-
monished to give "due regard" to the agency's determination of
credibility.' However, subsection 964G(6) accords such weight to deter-
minations of credibility only "where the agency has the opportunity
to judge of the credibility of witnesses by first hand observation of
demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not .. .
Where evidence is taken not by the agency but by a hearing ex-
aminer who makes no comments or findings, or recommendations, the
Commission's findings do not carry the same weight as they would
if based on personal observations. In such cases, the standard of review
is "whether the conclusion reached is arbitrary or capricious or
manifestly wrong. """1
Finally, parties properly may seek judicial relief if an agency
refuses to act on their claims, that is, refuses to hold a hearing or
make a decision."2 Judicial review of agency action is very broad in
Louisiana and is considered essential to securing administrative due
process.
VII. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
The LAPA also provides for legislative oversight of agency rules.2
The provisions were not part of the original Act. They were added
in 197 6 ,1U and later expanded and clarified.285 The purpose was "to
provide a procedure whereby the legislature may review the exer-
280. Dundy v. Louisiana State Univ., 394 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Jacomet
v. St. Landry Parish School Bd., 386 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
281. Merchant v. Department of Fin., 391 So. 2d 587, 588 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
282. Wolf v. State, 325 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
283. LA. R.S. 49.968 (Supp. 1976 & 1981).
284. 1976 La. Acts, No. 279, S 1.
285. 1981 La. Acts, No. 877, S 1, No. 912, S 1; 1980 La. Acts, No. 392, S 2: 1978
La. Acts, No. 252, S 1.
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cise of rule making authority, an extension of the legislative law mak-
ing function which it has delegated to state agencies." '8 The Act re-
quires specified agencies to submit to designated legislative commit-
tees reports on the intended adoption, amendment or repeal of any
rule. Agencies must submit these reports on the same day that notice
of the intended action is given to the Department of the State Register
for publication." 7
The LAPA requires an agency to include in its report a copy of
the proposed action. The report must specify the nature of the in-
tended rule or change, and must cite the legislation which authorizes
the action. In addition, the report must state the circumstances which
require the action, and must include a statement of the fiscal and
economic impact of the proposed rule. The fiscal and economic
statements both must be approved by the Legislative Fiscal Office."
The committees to which the rules are submitted may meet jointly
or separately, or may appoint joint or separate subcommittees to hold
hearings on the proposed action. The hearings shall determine whether
the rule or change conforms with the enabling legislation or with other
applicable provisions of law or the constitution, and whether the ac-
tion is advisable or meritorious.89 Such determinations are made by
a majority vote."'
Upon reaching a determination, the committee may in turn report
to the submitting agency in accordance with section 953. The com-
mittee report must include a copy of the rule, and a summary and
explanation of the committee's decision. If the committee finds the
proposed rule unacceptable, the LAPA requires the committee to
report in writing to the governor, explaining its determination. If the
governor takes no action within five days, the rule will not be adopted,
but may be changed and resubmitted. However, if the committee
reaches no conclusion or if the governor overrules the committee
within five days, the rule or change takes effect at its normal time."'
Additionally, the LAPA provides for a yearly review of agency
action. Thirty days prior to the beginning of the regular legislative
session, each agency must report to the specified committee. The
report must contain an account of all rules and changes proposed dur-
ing the previous year, including the full range of information contain-
286. LA. R.S. 49:968A (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 877, S 1.
287. Id. S 968B.
288. Id. S 968C. See also id. at SS 953, 954 (Supp. 1981).
289. Id. S 968D.
290. Id. S 968E.
291. Id. S 968F.
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ed in the reports on proposed rule changes. The yearly review report
must also include a summary of data or arguments received in con-
nection with the proposed rule or modification. The report must
describe the final action on the rule taken by the agency.' Upon sub-
mission of the report, the committee may hold public hearings to
review the report with representatives of the submitting agency.m
Before the second day of the legislative session, the committee may
then report to the full legislature with respect to the rules and hear-
ings, along with the committee's recommendations." 4
The LAPA also includes a provision on legislative veto of agency
rules and regulations."' In addition to the provisions on oversight,
the LAPA empowers the legislature, by concurrent resolution, to sus-
pend or nullify any rule or regulation proposed or adopted by any
state agency, department, board, or commission.
In addition to the provisions on legislative oversight, a 1981 amend-
ment to the LAPA added a provision on gubernational suspension
or veto of rules and regulations. ' The governor is given authority
to veto or suspend any rule or regulation within thirty days of its
adoption."' Upon issuing such an order, the governor is required to
transmit copies of the order to the speaker of the house of represen-
tatives and to the president of the senate.'
Legislative oversight represents an important new development
in state administrative procedure. The full range of legal questions
which may be generated by such procedures as the legislative veto
has not been fully developed.'
VIII. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION
Two problems which stem from the LAPA require special com-
ment. The first deals with the lack of flexibility in procedures,
especially the adjudication procedures. The second deals with the ex-
clusion of local agencies from the scope of the Act.
292. Id. S 968H.
293. Id. S 9681.
294. Id. S 968M.
295. Id. S 969.
296. 1981 La. Acts, No. 453, S 1.
297. LA. R.S, 49:970 (Supp. 1981), added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 453, S 1.
298. Id.
299. Some of these are discussed in the comments to sections 3-202 to 3-204 of
the draft of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws Model
State Administrative Procedure Act (1981). See also Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note
1, at 895.
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A. Lack of Flexibility
The original APA's' are basic documents which deal with cer-
tain pressing problems in administrative procedure. They are succinct,
sometimes cryptic in style. For example, the original APA's divide
administrative action into rule-making and adjudication and the LAPA
follows that pattern."' Accordingly, agency action has to fit into one
of these categories to be covered by the LAPA. If the action does
not fit either definition it is not covered. Certain procedures apply
to rule-making. Other procedures have to be followed in adjudication.
But within each of the respective categories it is essentially an all
or nothing proposition. There is little flexibility in the older models,
particularly in the area of adjudication.
The LAPA is unduly rigid in two respects. First, by definition,
it excludes a considerable amount of agency action. To trigger the
application of the LAPA adjudication rules, the agency action must
be of the type which results in the formulation of an order or deci-
sion. Also, even where an action results in an order or decision, the
LAPA applies only where constitutional or statutory provisions man-
date a decision on the record after notice and hearing. This definition
excludes all cases where, for example, emergency action must be taken
first, to be followed by a hearing. That kind of hearing, strictly speak-
ing, need not follow the adjudication rules. "
The second problem with the adjudication rules is that once one
determines that they apply, they all apply. Only one kind of hearing
is contemplated by the LAPA. The rules do not recognize the con-
siderable variety among agencies and the actions taken by agencies.
Some actions demand rigid adherence to court-like formalities, while
others may be taken best in a less formal proceeding. The adjudica-
tion requirements of the LAPA are demanding, time consuming and
expensive. As such, one may be tempted to follow the rules only when
they apply beyond any doubt to the agency action in question. To
avoid delay, expense and inconvenience agencies might tend to read
the language which specifies when the adjudication rules apply in the
narrowest manner.
The single-type hearing provision of the Act presents other prob-
lems. The LAPA adjudication rules apply not only when constitution-
300. 5 U.S.C. SS 500-706 (1976); Model Administrative Procedure Act of 1961.
301. But see note 34, supra.
302. Of course, notwithstanding the limited scope of the Act, some courts have
referred to various provisions of the LAPA in driver's license cases, for example, where
suspension precedes any hearing. Even when acknowledging that the LAPA may not
be applicable, some courts have relied on its rules by analogy. See the discussion of
license revocation cases, notes 139-55, supra.
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ally required but also when required by an act of the legislature. In
the latter case, the legislature can evaluate the kinds of decisions that
an agency must make and weigh the interests of the agency in mak-
ing those decisions quickly and inexpensively. At the same time the
lawmakers can weigh the interests of people who may be adversely
affected by agency action. Finally, the legislature can assess the public
interest and the need for expeditious, yet careful and fair agency
decision-making.
The legislature, in making its assessment whether to impose the
requirements of the LAPA in a particular context, must take into
account that only one adjudication procedure is available under the
Act and that procedure is a very formal one. Thus, the legislature
has three options: make the LAPA applicable; make the Act inap-
plicable and fashion a set of rules to be applied in a particular situa-
tion; or make the LAPA inapplicable, provide a few guidelines for
the agency, and let it fashion its own decision-making process."'
Consider the status of the State Athletic Commission. The rele-
vant statute provides: "The Commission's hearings, practice and pro-
cedure and rule and regulation making procedure are as provided
in . . ." the LAPA.3 ' The section on revocation of licenses provides
that: "The commission may for cause, and after a hearing, revoke or
suspend any license. . . .'" The kind of hearing the commission must
provide as a prerequisite to suspending or revoking a license is not
specified. The statute which deals with the Athletic Commission says
that the LAPA applies, but it does not specify which section of the
LAPA. Does it mean the adjudication section or the section on revoca-
tion of licenses? The latter section does not use the word "hearing"
but instead requires merely that a licensee be "given an opportunity
to show compliance" before revocation is permitted. Yet the revoca-
tion or suspension of a license by the Athletic Commission requires
a prior hearing. The statute does not require that a Commission deci-
sion or order of revocation be on the record after notice and hearing.
If the LAPA adjudication rules do not apply to the hearing which
is mandated by statute, what form does the hearing take? What pro-
cedural rights does the licensee haie? The legislature apparently has
left the agency to formulate its own hearing procedures. No model
was shaped by the legislature to guide agencies in making decisions
and orders under procedures less formal than the adjudication rules
303. In fact, we know that agencies do formulate and use informal adjudication
procedures notwithstanding the lack of any legislative sanction for doing so. See Verkuil,
A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures. 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976).
304. LA. R.S. 4:84 (Supp. 1974).
305. Id. S 65(C).
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of the LAPA. In those situations, agencies may be giving parties too
little in the way of procedural protection.
In other situations, agencies under the LAPA may be required
to provide more than fairness demands. Under the LAPA, where the
federal or state constitution requires that a decision be made on the
record after notice and hearing, the adjudication procedures must be
followed. During the past ten years the application of procedural due
process requirements has increased vastly."' Previously, due process
applied only in situations which affected life, liberty and property.
The notion of property was confined by the limits of property law.
Privileges, for example, were not property interests and could be af-
fected without compliance with the demands for procedural due pro-
cess. However, today the so-called "right-privilege" distinction is vir-
tually dead. The United States Supreme Court and other courts follow-
ing its lead have imposed due process requirements on a host of situa-
tions involving mere privilege, including welfare benefits, government
employment, driver's licenses, and school discipline."'
At least two implications arise from this development. First, the
growth in the applicability of due process means that many more in-
cidents of agency action are subject to due process requirements and
to the requirements of the adjudication process of the LAPA. In other
words, the LAPA may cover agency action which was not con-
templated when the Act was drafted.
Second, the growth in the applicability of due process to ad-
ministrative actions has been accompanied by another development:
the notion of "variable" due process."A A court which determines that
due process must be observed in a particular proceeding must also
determine which specific procedures must be followed to comply with
due process. The Supreme Court lately has been using an approach
which requires that certain procedures be followed in only some cases.
In other words, the Court has recognized the variety of agency ac-
tions and the need for flexibility2A"
The irony of this development is that when the due process notice
and hearing requirements trigger the application of a state ad-
306. See note 125, supra.
307. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school discipline); Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (employment termination); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971) (driver's license suspension); Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public aid
benefits).
308. Bonfield, Adjudication, supra note 1, at 337.
309. Compare, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) with Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1 (1979); compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) with Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
1292 [Vol. 42
LOUISIANA PROCEDURE ACT
ministrative procedure act, the adjudication procedures which must
be followed may be more demanding than those which are mandated
by the constitution. For example, in Wolff v. McDonnell,10 the United
States Supreme Court said that prison disciplinary proceedings which
result in loss of "good time" required the use of procedures which
comply with due process. However, in determining that "some kind
of hearing" was necessary, the Court said that inmates have no con-
stitutional right to confrontation of witnesses, cross-examination or
counsel. The rule the Louisiana Department of Corrections drafted,
perhaps with one eye on the LAPA, was described as follows:
[T]hese rules provide for notice of charges to be heard before a
prison disciplinary board, the right to present evidence and to
confront and cross-examine his accusers, the right to remain silent,
the right to counsel or counsel substitute .... I
Certainly the legislature and administrative agencies should not be
discouraged from extending procedural rights to parties who par-
ticipate in agency hearings. At the same time some concern must be
shown for the public interest in expeditious resolution of matters
before those agencies.
The need for flexibility in the decision-making process has been
recognized by some states. Florida, for example, provides for two types
of hearings, formal and informal.2
Of more importance is that the National Conference of Commis-
sioners of Uniform State Laws has superseded the Revised Model
State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961 and has approved the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1981. The new Model
Act includes four types of hearings: formal, conference, emergency
and summary.8 ' The required procedures vary, depending on the type
of hearing. Agencies have some flexibility in selecting the procedure
to be used.
The Model Act of 1981 reflects a need for flexibility by broaden-
ing the applicability of the APA to include more aspects of agency
action, but not requiring all procedures to be followed in all cases.
It recognizes that fairness is but one (albeit an important one) of the
goals of administrative procedure. Agency efficiency and the ability
of an agency to meet the expectations of parties and the public must
also be promoted in the APA. This recognition does not necessarily
represent a lessening of concern for procedural fairness. In some
310. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
311. State ex rel. Armistead v. Phelps, 365 So. 2d 468, 46849 (La. 1978).
312. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 120.57(1), (2) (West Supp. 1974-81).
313. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT SS 4-101 to 4-506 (1981).
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respects by making the procedures flexible they can become more
realistic and, as such, may encourage the legislature, agencies and
courts to extend coverage, rather than find exceptions to the ap-
plicability of administrative procedure acts."'
The norms of administrative process are complex. One authority
on federal administrative procedure has stated the need for overall
fairness and flexibility."5 Among the advantages of adopting a flexi-
ble approach to hearing procedures is that agency officials, who must
comply with minimal due process requirements but who do not have
to conduct a formal hearing, would receive some guidance in their
actions if the LAPA were amended to include informal adjudication
procedures. There are other advantages:
1. Agencies and courts may be encouraged to interpret broadly
the scope of the LAPA.
2. The legislature will not have to fashion exceptions to the
LAPA.
3. Rules would fill the gap created when the legislature has indi-
cated that agency action must be based upon a hearing but
has not made the LAPA applicable or fashioned specific pro..
cedures for such hearings.
4. Agencies may be able to operate more efficiently and yet.
observe fair procedures.
314. See Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and
The Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389 (1977); Gifford, The New
York State Administrative Procedure Act: Some Reflections Upon Its Structure and
Legislative History, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 589 (1977).
315.
Administrative procedure should be concerned with the overall fairness and ac-
curacy of decisions, with their efficient and low-cost resolution, and, in a democratic
society, with participant satisfaction with the process. These three norms (which
can be described in shorthand form as fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction) have
been identified by the scholarly community and acknowledged by Congress. But
while they have become consensus values, it is no less difficult to give them mean-
ing (and avoid a new tautology of administrative procedure) than it is meaningful
to describe the values of judicial procedure. Indeed the task is in some ways
more complicated. In the first place, the values are inter-disciplinary, which means
that to be understood a new communicative technique is required. Secondly, they
are inherently conflicting in their demands; each may be vindicated only at the
expense of the others ....
While the careful formulation of procedural policy is in the distance, there
is at least one confident first principle: to reconcile the often conflicting values of
administrative procedure, procedural experimentation and flexibility becomes a nor-
mative responsibility of administrative law.
Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258,
279-80 (1978) (emphasis added).
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5. Agencies will be able to shape their procedures according
to the expanding notions and variable nature of due process.
B. The Exclusion of Local Agencies from the LAPA
Courts have assumed that the LAPA was never intended to ap-
ply to some local entities. 1 Thus, although the precise scope of the
political subdivision exclusion is uncertain, clearly the LAPA will not
apply to some, perhaps most, local entities. What procedures should
be followed by those agencies not within the LAPA? In some cases
the legislature has enumerated certain procedures, such as in the
legislation dealing with planning commissions."' These agencies are
authorized to make long-range development plans for the community.
The commissioners are required to hold open meetings at least once
a month, adopt and publish rules for the transaction of business, and
to keep a record of all violations, findings and determinations. 1 ' Before
the adoption of a plan, the commission must hold at least one public
meeting, and it must provide ten days notice of the hearing by publica-
tion in a local newspaper of general circulation."' Some other statutes
impose certain procedures on local agencies."
These procedural provisions are not necessarily comprehensive.
They are not uniform. Worse yet, they do not apply to entities created
by political subdivisions under general constitutional grants or under
other powers given to them. This is particularly true of those
municipalities which operate under a home rule charter.
The increasing independence of political subdivisions from absolute
state control, the increase in the number of parochial and municipal
agencies, and the importance of their role in conducting the affairs
of government reveal a need to establish minimal procedural guidelines
for their actions.821
316. The definition of "agency" now makes this explicit.
317. LA. R.S. 33:101 (1950).
318. Id. S 104.
319. Id. S 103.
320. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 33:140.56 (Supp. 1962), 2396 (1950), 2476 (Supp. 1981).
321. A noted authority on state administrative law has expressed a need for some
procedural rules to govern agencies of political subdivisions: '
The definition [agencyl includes all commissions created by state government
which exercise rulemaking and adjudicatory powers.... The definition does not
include municipal corporations; such organizations typically delegate rulemaking
and adjudicatory powers to their own administrative agencies .. created within
city or county governments, being creatures of local government rather than of
the state government, are not normally within the provisions of the state act.
A need exists for legislation prescribing procedural standards for such municipa
and county agencies. In view ... it is generally thought that it would be imprac-
ticable to make them conform to all the formal procedures required of state agen-
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One commentator in explaining why political subdivisions were
excluded from the Iowa APA nevertheless pointed out that legisla-
tion was needed to create procedures for local agencies. Trying to
combine state and local agency procedures in one act was thought
too complicated since some differences between them would have to
have been provided for.n This view was reiterated in the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1981. 23
Several states, Hawaii and Florida for example, specifically include
local governmental units within their APA's."' The question is, could
Louisiana adopt an APA which would establish minimal procedural
requirements to be followed by agencies of political subdivisions?
Under the Constitution of 1921, the legislature exercised exten-
sive powers over local governmental subdivisions, even in regard to
so-called home ruled jurisdictions. The home rule charters contained
in the 1921 Constitution, which granted local governmental subdivi-
sions authority over their structure and organization of government,
did not give them absolute authority over "government powers." The
Constitution of 1921 also provided, in part: "the provisions of this Con-
stitution and of any general law passed by the legislature shall be
paramount and no municipality shall exercise any power or authority
which is inconsistent or in conflict therewith.""' It provided further:
"The City of New Orleans shall, however, not exercise any power or
authority which is inconsistent or in conflict with general law."' Thus,
cies. The courts do require .... that such municipal and county agencies conduct
their activities in a manner consistent with the requirements of procedural due pro-
Ces8. But it would serve the public interest to provide a simplified procedural
code for all municipal and county agencies exercising rulemaking or adjudicatory
powers, and providing a uniform method of judicial review. The "Commentary"
on the Revised Model State Act .... points out that it may be desirable to in-
clude some of the city or county agencies within the state act.
I F. COOPER, STATE AMINISTRATIVE LAW 97-98 (1965) (emphasis added).
322. The conclusion recommended by one of the draftsmen to the Iowa APA was
that:
A separate study should ... be undertaken of local Iowa administrative agencies
with the objective of drafting an administrative procedure act geared specifically
to the needs of Iowa's local governmental units. Such an act will be even less
detailed than the [Iowa] APA. It will also have to adjust to the realities of the
peculiar problems of local agencies and take into account the fact that human
and other resources less available at the local level than at the state level.
Id.
323. Comments to S 1-102.
324. See HAWAII REV. STAT. S 91-1(1) (1968); 4 Fla. Leg. Serv. ch. 74-310, S 120.5201c)
(West 1974). See also Bonfield, Iowa APA, supra note 1, at 762 n.149.
325. LA. CONST. art. XIV, S 40(d) (1921).
326. Id., S 22.
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litigation was needed to distinguish between state legislation which
properly affected the powers of a local governmental subdivision and
those which improperly infringed upon its structure, organization, or
functions. The line was far from clear.m
The Constitution of 1974 raises several questions as to the author-
ity of the legislature in this area. It states that "Ithe legislature shall
enact no law the effect of which changes or affects the structure and
organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the
powers and functions of any local governmental subdivision which
operates under a home rule charter."' The enactment of a general
law by the state which establishes procedures to be used by local
agencies in formulating rules and making decisions or orders would
not appear to change the structure and organization of local political
subdivisions in that such legislation would be purely procedural. Nor
would such legislation affect the distribution of a local government
unit's power among its various components.
Local governmental subdivisions may adopt home rule charters
under the 1974 Constitution which "shall provide the structure and
organization, powers and functions of the government of the local
governmental subdivision, which may include the exercise of any
power and performance of any function necessary, requisite, or pro-
per for the management of its affairs, not denied by general law.... ."I"
Existing charters may be amended to include the full range of local
governmental powers.
The Constitution of 1974, unlike the 1921 Constitution, contains
a broad delegation of "powers" to political subdivisions. These powers,
like the earlier more limited grants under the 1921 Constitution, may
be exercised so long as they are "not denied by general law.", The
legislature, then, does not seem to be precluded under this provision
from adopting as a general law an APA which would apply to political
subdivisions."
More troublesome, however, is the section of the 1974 Constitu-
327. The relationship between state and local governments is discussed in the follow-
ing commentaries: Hershman, Coastal Zone Management and State-Local Relations .nder
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 22 Loy. L. REV. 273 (1976); Kean, Local Government
and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REv. 63 (1979); Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local Government Law, 40 LA. L. REv. 681 (1980);
Comment, Exclusive Powers of Louisiana Home Rule Municipalities and Parishes, 23
Loy. L. REV. 961 (1977); Comment, Land-Use Control in Louisiana: Administrative Law
and Urban Growth, 39 TUL. L. REV. 558 (1965).
328. LA. CONST. art. VI, S 6.
329. Id. S 5(E) (emphasis added).
330. Id.
331. See text at notes 41-53, supra.
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tion which provides: "[tihe governing authority of a local governmen-
tal subdivision shall have general power over any agency heretofore
or hereafter created by it, including, without limitation, the power
to abolish the agency. ."n The provision confirms that the author-
ity to create an agency, as a corollary, creates a power to define the
scope of an agency's authority, and procedures to be followed, even
to the point of restructuring or abolishing the agency. What power
then, if any, does the legislature have? With regard to any particular
agency, the answer is probably "none." The provision, however, should
not limit the power of the legislature by general legislation to create
a uniform law for fair administrative procedures at the local level.
Seemingly, this power to control local agencies is no less subject to
the qualification that a power may be exercised by a local political
subdivision so long as it is "not denied by general law." As stated
above, the enactment of a general law which enumerates the pro-
cedures to be followed by local administrative agencies would deny
to local governmental subdivisions the power to provide conflicting
procedures.' In Southern Tours v. New Orleans Aviation Board,m the
New Orleans City Council attempted to override a recommendation
of the New Orleans Aviation Board. In the words of the court, the
Board was "originally created" by ordinance in 1943 and "was created
as part of the executive branch in 1954 when the citizens of the city
adopted the Home Rule Charter.""5 Although a subsequent ordinance
in 1960 "purported to create the Board, the existence of the Board
was derived from the Home Rule Charter, which cannot be amended
or modified by Council ordinance. Accordingly the Board's powers as
an arm of the executive branch, derived from the Home Rule Charter
and from the Legislature, cannot be taken away by the Council." The
court concluded that the Council had no power to abolish the Board
or to substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Article VI, sec-
tion 15 did not apply.'
Thus, there may be some agencies which could be characterized
as entities of political subdivisions but which are not subject to con-
trol by the political subdivision. These agencies should not be free
from all control, and the legislature by general law should be able
to impose procedural requirements on their activities.
A strong argument can be made in favor of the legality of a
legislatively enacted local government APA. The legislature's authority
332. LA. CONST. art. VI, S 15.
333. As a matter of fact, it may be necessary to reserve such power in the
legislature.
334. 357 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 800 (La. 1978).
335. Id. at 104-05.
336. Id. at 105.
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to prescribe fair procedures may be regarded as adjunct to its police
power, or to its responsibility to comply with due process by pro-
viding that each person in Louisiana is subject only to fair ad-
ministrative practices. Article XV, section 6, while recognizing the
general power of political subdivisions to diagram the structure of,
and to provide for their local agencies, does not prohibit explicitly
or implicitly the legislature from passing general legislation which may
impact incidentally on the agency by requiring adherence to a limited
number of procedural rules. Certainly the legislature which has
enacted the Public Records Law, 7 which applies to state and local
government, and the Open Meetings Law"8 which applies to state and
local bodies, should not be precluded from providing notice of, access
to, participation in, and a fair. hearing in local agency actions.
If an administrative agency makes no record of its proceedings,
observes no formalities whatsoever, conducts some of its affairs
behind closed doors and provides the parties with no finding what-
soever, the entire purpose of the administrative determination is
defeated and the concept of judicial review is frustrated. This is
precisely the reason why the Administrative Procedure Act was
adopted."
Finally, the adoption of such an act has two other advantages.
The act would provide guidelines for complying with the requirements
of procedural due process which have been extended to the activities
of local agencies." In addition the law would provide a uniform method
for judicial review.
337. LA. RS. 44:1 (Supp. 1981).
338. Id.
339. Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 360 So. 2d 572, 575 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 367 So. 2d 849 (La. 1979).
340. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Horn v. County of Ventura, 156 Cal. Rpr. 718, 595 P.2d 1134 (1979).
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